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Playing Poker at the U.N.*
Paul H. Brietzke**
I. Introduction
The sprawling institutions of the United Nations ("U.N.")' are the
major sources of modem international law. These institutions generate a
bewildering variety of treaties which are opened for nation-states to sign
as well as create reams of international "soft" and customary law.2
Founded more than sixty years ago,3 the U.N. sought to reform itself
through initiatives that responded to perceived mid-life crises. This
reform process came to a head at the September 2005 World Summit.
This Article seeks to explain why these initiatives largely failed, and why
international law thus remains mostly unchanged. A poker-like model is
adapted to explain U.N. processes. 4 The 2005 reform initiatives are then
analyzed with the help of this model,5 paying particular attention to
human rights (non-)reforms and (the lack of) progress over implementing
the Millennium Development Goals.6 Assuming that this degree of
* Presented to the Comparative Constitutionalism and Rights Conference, Dec. 10-
13, 2005, Durban, South Africa. This Article is current as of the date of its presentation.
** Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law; B.A. Lake Forest, J.D.
Wisconsin, and Ph.D. London; Paul.Brietzke@valpo.edu. Comments and criticisms are
welcome.
1. See Roger Coate, Transcript, U.N. World Summit Set to Begin, WASH. POST,
Sept. 14, 2005, 2 PM, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/
2005/08/30/DI2005083001391.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2007). The U.N. is a "family"
of intergovernmental agencies, including the International Labour Organisation, the
World Bank, the World Trade Organization, etc. See id. Reform must be seen as
systemic, "not just tinkering with things in New York." Id.
2. See generally Paul H. Brietzke, Insurgents in the 'New' International Law, 13
WIS. INT'L L.J. 1 (1995). Although the U.N. is responsible for generating various sources
of international law, subsequent implementation and enforcement are much more
problematic.
3. The U.N. officially came into existence on October 24, 1945, when the Charter
was ratified by a majority of signatories. See History of the United Nations,
http://www.un.org/aboutun/unhistory/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
4. See discussion infra notes 13-86 and accompanying text.
5. See discussion infra notes 87-220 and accompanying text.
6. See generally id. I will follow the precedent set by Professor Philip Alston and
reproduce the Millennium Development Goals in the Appendix. See Philip Alston, Ships
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reform failure is undesirable, at least on balance, some remedies are then
discussed.7
International law can be defined by its purposes. Four such
interrelated definitions will be used in this Article. First and ideally,
international law (and the other functions of the U.N.) seeks to enhance
security and human dignity/capability. Second, international law seeks
to implement a seeming paradox: global governance without a global
government able to harmonize, integrate, and enforce laws and policies.8
Such arrangements create what economists call "collective action
problems." 9 Analogies to the governance without government model can
be found in the long history of Islamic or Judaic law and within
indigenous groups lacking formal rulers and living by the reciprocal
observances of rules. 10
Third, while the profits from an economic globalization can usually
be appropriated by particular corporations or countries, most of the rest
of international law seeks to create "public goods": human rights, peace,
development, a healthy environment, etc. These goods belong to
everyone, and no one, other than an altruist, wants to bear the costs of
pursuing them. Unlike profits from an economic globalization, public
goods cannot be appropriated for the pursuer's sole benefit in the short
run. Another set of collective action problems, or "market failures,"
arise from the resulting under-supply of these public goods: only
altruists will pursue them in the poker games to be described, except
when these public goods serve some other game purpose. In other
words, everyone wants to win by being a "free rider" who reaps good
things paid for by others."
Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate
Seen Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals, 27 HuM. RTS. Q. 755 app.
(2005).
7. See discussion infra notes 221-34 and accompanying text.
8. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 21 (2002); Paul
H. Brietzke, Globalization, Nationalism, & Human Rights, 17 FLA. J. INT'L L. 633 (2005);
Tony Evans, International Human Rights Law as Power/Knowledge, 22 H. RTS. Q. 1046,
1054-55 (2005) (stating that "discipline" as social organization without the need for
coercion is "a form of modernist power"); id. at 1065 (pessimists quote investment
banker Robert Hormats-the "great beauty of globalization is that no one is in control.").
Evan's opening argument shows his British heritage since it was first used by the poet
Mathew Arnold when he was also Headmaster of Rugby School where the sport of
loosely-organized mayhem originated. It later formed the ideology of British colonialism
in Africa: governance with the fewest resources possible, sometimes called Indirect Rule.
9. See generally Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach, 73 U.
CHI. L. REv. 487 (2006); John C. Yoo, Force Rules: U.N. Reform & Intervention, 6 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 641 (2005).
10. See Globalization, Nationalism, & Human Rights, supra note 8.
11. See id.; Yoo, supra note 9; Posner, supra note 9 at 520-22. Posner suggests the
Rwandan genocide presents an example of this market failure. See id. In such a
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Finally, international law provides the rules for the poker games that
will be described. These games are about access to, and a measure of
control over, an interchangeable wealth and power pursued through legal
and other processes.12
II. The Game's Afoot
Anyone who analyzes the international law produced by the U.N.
necessarily uses an explicit or implicit model, if only to tame the
intractability of the material. For example, two game theorists 13 won the
2005 Nobel Prize in Economics for modeling a relatively well-known
means of conflict management which grew out of the Cold War. To
paraphrase William Blake, I must either create my own model or be
dominated by someone else's. 14 However, the reader is promised that
taking the time to understand my poker model will yield important
insights not readily available in other ways.
Inevitably, under such models sharp competitions must take place
within a cooperative framework so that a game does not end in the
violent conflict that spawns international anarchy. Building trust and
collaborations. through small compromises proves the most fruitful path,
because one can always punish uncooperative players (perceived
defectors) in subsequent rounds of play ("hands" of poker).'5 Briefing
the United States ("U.S.") House International Relations Committee,
Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown argues that U.N. reform
"has to be the work of a coalition, and holding that coalition together is
circumstance, even if all countries would benefit from the termination of the genocide in
Rwanda, each country would have been even better off if other countries bore the
considerable risks and costs of stopping the violence. See id. at 521-22. In terms of the
poker model, this is like using other people's money to play poker, while keeping any
winnings for yourself.
12. See Globalization, Nationalism, & Human Rights, supra note 8. The poker
model, presented in detail infra, has been adapted from this prior work.
13. The American Thomas Schelling and the Israeli Robert Aumann were the
deserving recipients. See Michael Muskal & Ken Ellingwood, Two Game Theorists Win
the Nobel Prize for Economics, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, at Cl; Editorial, The Trade
Game, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005, at B1O (discussing the relevance of game theory to
international negotiations); War Games, ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 2005, at 106 (discussing
the work of Thomas Schelling and Robert Aumann, winners of the 2005 Nobel Prize in
Economics).
14. See William Blake, Jerusalem: The Emanation of the Giant Albion, in BLAKE:
THE COMPLETE POEMS 648, 676 (W.H. Stevenson ed., Pearson Educ. Ltd. 2007) (1971).
In this epic poem, Blake writes: "I must Create a System or be enslav'd by another
Man's." Id.
15. See generally Globalization, Nationalism, & Human Rights, supra note 8; The
Trade Game, supra note 13 (modeling the Doha round of WTO trade negotiations and
recognizing game theorists' belief in the value of cooperation); War Games, supra note
13.
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the surest way to success."' 6
Our topic-multidimensional and interrelated disputes and needs
occurring in many geographic and subject matter areas at the same
time-is far too complex 17 to be modeled as the two-person, one-subject
game described supra. Likewise, there are few "economies of scale in a
[legal] rule specific enough unambiguously to govern a decision; over
time, the increasingly-difficult question becomes which of these
proliferating specific rules resolves a particular dispute with some degree
of flexibility."' 8  This complexity, and the uncertainty it inevitably
breeds, are not products of an international anarchy. A more nuanced
view of governance is required: a search for fairly stable "rules of the
road" rather than an automatic Hobbesian' 9 recourse to coercion, which
is usually too costly these days for a variety of reasons.
The need for cooperation and coordination during bargaining can
often be met, even in the absence of a developed global state, because the
truly significant international "players" are few in number. They are five
in fact, and they constitute what economists might call a "loose
oligopoly": the U.S., Russia, China, the European Union ("E.U."), and
the U.N. itself.20 The very existence of the game, described infra, shows
16. United Nations Rhetoric or Reform: Outcome of the High-Level Event: Hearing
and Briefing Before the H. Comm. on Int'7 Relations, 109th Cong. 44 (2005) (prepared
statement of Mark Malloch Brown, Chief of Staff to the Secretary-General, United
Nations) [hereinafter, Brown], available at http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
archives/109/23694.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
17. See Coate, supra note 1; Alberto G. Romulo, Phil. Sec'y of Foreign Affairs,
Address Before the United Nations General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., 21st
plen. mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. A/60/PV.21 (Sept. 22, 2005); MARK TAYLOR, THE MOMENT OF
COMPLEXITY: EMERGING NETWORK CULTURE 3 (2001) ("We are in a moment of
unprecedented complexity, when things are changing faster than our ability to
comprehend them."); id. at 13-14 (reciting belief that we are far from equilibrium, at the
edge of chaos under complexity theory; all significant change occurs in the area lying
between too much and too little order).
18. Globalization, Nationalism, & Human Rights, supra note 8, at 677; see also
Werner Z. Hirsch, Reducing Law's Uncertainty and Complexity, 21 UCLA L. REV. 1233,
1248-49 (1974); see generally MICHAEL KING & CHRIS THORNHILL, NIKLAS LUHMANN'S
THEORY OF POLITICS AND LAW (Palgrave Macmillan 2003) (discussing Luhmann's
analyses); NIKLAS LUHMANN, OBSERVATIONS ON MODERNITY 27, 67-8 (William Whobrey
trans., Stanford University Press 1998); Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties
That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J.
INT'L L. 639, 641, 644 (1998); Paul Blustein, U.S. Free Trade Deals Include Few Muslim
Countries, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2004, at El; Exclusive, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 2004,at 94.
19. In the sense that Hobbes' state of nature is sometimes evident in global society.
He assumed that we would agree to Leviathan under such a SON, but global society is
too complex and too democratic in parts for such a consensus to emerge.
20. The latter two act as major players only when members coordinate their
communications, power and resources effectively-something the other majors can
usually take for granted. Although Congress, for example, occasionally speaks in a
different voice from that of the President.
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that, unlike a globalized economy or science, politics still recognizes and
informally operates through nation-state boundaries that define the
"players" and the sovereignty that still proves both inevitable and
necessary in international law and international relations. Thus, the
game fosters recognition that both the successes and the failures of the
U.N. and of its international law are those of interacting nation-states.
The game offers some solutions to economists' "collective action
problems," and to dealing with "public goods" and "free rider" problems
that are stimulated by the existence of very high "transaction costs" in
international relations. The resulting outcomes are necessarily too
complex to be captured by simpler versions of economists' game
theory.2'
The global relations of the five major players play out against a
backdrop of what economists might call a "competitive fringe": the
many countries that are too relatively poor and/or powerless to affect
outcomes much overall. Their role is usually supportive of consensus
among some or all of the five major players. This tactic minimizes the
antagonizing of major players and perhaps provocation of their
retaliation. The tactic also gives the minor players a sense of inclusion
in, and a "soft" power through, international law and relations. Some of
these many countries have a situational or geographical power with
regard to particular issues, a power which forces the majors to take them
into account for some purposes. For example, Saudi Arabia's oil and its
funding of Islamic fundamentalism in many Muslim countries demands
attention from the West.
22
A helpful extended analogy illustrating this small group behavior
leaves one imagining the five majors playing global poker games.
21. See Michael J. Glennon, Platonism, Adaptivism, and Illusion in UN Reform, 6
CHI. J. INT'L L. 613 (2006); Duncan Snidal, Political Economy and International
Institutions, 16 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 121, 126-28 (1996); see also JOHN H. JACKSON,
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 156 (2000); Richard Nobles & David Schiff, Introduction, in NIKLAS
LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM 1,49 (2004) (discussing Luhmann's ideas); see also
discussion supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Milton Viorst, Desert Storm, THE NATION, Sept. 26, 2005, at 3 1.
Viorst writes that Saudi Arabia was a good counter to both Egypt's Nasser and Iraq's
Saddam, and a surrogate after the Shah of Iran was overthrown. Id. But the U.S.'s
inability to wean itself off cheap oil and corrupting contacts between U.S. and Saudi
elites blinded the U.S. to Saudi nurturing of a militant anti-Westemism, including that of
al Qaeda, and the alienation of Saudi Arabia's own citizens.
23. See JAMES V. KOCH, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PRICES 268-69 (1974)
(comparing oligopolistic competition to a neighborhood poker game). The ideal analogy
to oligopoly would (1) define the number of actors, and (2) account for (a) procedures,
(b) asymmetries of, for example, information and understanding of political and
economic forces, (c) the ways expectations are conveyed, (d) an uncertainty of outcomes,
and (e) the managing of cooperation. See JACKSON, supra note 21, at 18, 42, 156
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They have played together for so long that each is aware of the past
behavioral patterns of the others, although the styles of play from some
new player-representatives can disrupt the game.24 In particular, each
player has views about the strengths and weaknesses of its own play and
about the reactions other players will have to its own projected actions.
Unlike chess, poker is played at speed and player information is seriously
incomplete. Players try to fill informational gaps by evaluating
opponents' behavior while attempting to conceal the significance of their
own: in other words, practicing good diplomacy.25 In contrast, President
Bush telegraphs tactics in his speeches. These anticipated reactions
affect the players' actions in turn.
The barriers to becoming a major player are substantial, which is
just the way incumbent majors want to keep it. Such conditions hold
sway even if other seats around the poker table (up to a total of eight,
say, although up to ten can play five-card stud) are filled by temporary
players.26 The range of feasible outcomes from any given "hand" (round
of play) is reduced markedly by the particular players' predilections, but
the actual outcome is still indeterminate because of unforeseen events
which are external to the game and because information is imperfect.27
An example will prove useful here. North Korea's nukes offer a
valuable illustration. While Russia has been rather inactive, China has
bet the most and has the biggest stake in the matter-even rivaling North
Korea's stake. Resolving this dispute would greatly enhance Chinese
prestige by helping to convert its growing economic power into
geopolitical power. China has leverage, controlling thirty percent of
(discussing problems and consequences associated with complex international
agreements); see also Snidal, supra note 21, at 123-24 (describing regime theory's
conception of "international regime" as a tool to describe global political cooperation).
The poker game analogy arguably satisfies these criteria.
24. For example, the elections of President Bush or Putin shift the foreign policy of
each nation; likewise, Bush's appointment of John Bolton as Ambassador to the U.N.
alters the way the game is played. See discussion infra notes 43-47, 59-66, 118-19 and
accompanying text.
25. See DAVID SKLANSKY, THE THEORY OF POKER 17, 245 (4th ed. 2005); ALBERT H.
MOREHEAD & GEOFFREY MOTT-SMITH, HOYLE'S RULES OF GAMES 267 (3d rev. ed. 2001);
see also Marking the Dealer's Cards, ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 2005, at 100 (noting
Friedrich Hayek saw the economy running on "dispersed bits of incomplete and
frequently contradictory knowledge" communicated to everyone through shifts in market
prices-or bets in the poker model).
26. Japan and both North and South Korea are examples of players that temporarily
claim a seat at the global poker game. See discussion infra notes 28-31 and
accompanying text.
27. In poker, imperfect information is rampant and often includes who has which
cards (or which "hole" card(s) if "stud" poker is being played) and what strategy the
player will employ. This perfectly illustrates international relations.
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North Korea's food and more than seventy percent of its fuel, 28 but China
also has the most to lose. The collapse of the North Korean regime
would flood China with many stability-endangering refugees. South
Korea's style of play has changed from fear to an ambiguous pity for
brethren who could never be absorbed economically through
reunification.29 Meanwhile, the strategy of the U.S. is difficult to
evaluate. Like China and Russia,30 North Korea threatens U.S. military
dominance in the region, and poses a diffuse threat to a valued ally,
Japan. Yet Japan seems only mildly concerned. Above all, mutual
incomprehension and translation difficulties plague the course of play
between the U.S. and North Korea.3' It is thus difficult to know the
outcome from the several hands that have been played. Key questions
remain. Who won and lost what? Was some agreement reached and, if
so, what are its terms? Does it include a light-water reactor for North
Korea? 32 Above all, have global concerns over a nuclear proliferation
gotten lost during the heat of play-perhaps because U.N. involvement
has been mostly limited to providing food aid to North Korea?
In this model, the poker players are nation-state leaders or their
appointees. They play with interchangeable wealth and power belonging
to other people: the taxpayers, etc. The players' style of play is
consequently less cautious than it would be if players were investing
their personal wealth and power in the game.
The playwright David Mamet displays a deep understanding of
poker while modeling contemporary American politics.33 For Mamet,
28. See Charles Krauthammer, Op-Ed., China's Moment, WASH. POST, Sept. 23,
2005, at A23, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives";
search "1987-Current" for "'China's Moment') (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
29. See Philip Bowring, Op-Ed., Modeling Korean Unification, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Sept. 27, 2005, at 8.
30. See discussion infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
31. See Tong Kim, You Say Olieryok, I Say Deterrent, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2005,
at B I, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search
"1987-Current" for "Okjeryok") (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
32. See Bowring, supra note 29; Joseph Kahn, North Korea Sets New Demand for
Ending Arms Program, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A8, available at
http://www.nytimes.com (search "North Korea Sets New Demand for Ending Arms
Program") (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Glenn Kessler, Op-Ed., What That Accord Really
Says, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2005, at B2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com
(select "Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for "What that Accord Really Says")
(last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Kim, supra note 31, at B1; Krauthammer, supra note 28, at
A23; The Deal That Wasn 't, ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2005, at 49; North Korea Rejects UN
Food Aid, Sept. 23, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4273844.stm (last
visited Nov. 3, 2007).
33. See David Mamet, Op-Ed., Poker Party, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005,
http://www.orlok.com/blog/archive-listserver/mb-civic/2005-September/0 13134.html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
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the only way to win, to seize the initiative, is to "raise. 34 However, if
you have never raised before, the other players will simply "fold.93 5 On
the other hand, an excess of past raises 36 will pique the other players'
suspicions. One or several will likely "call your bluff' by matching or
raising your raise(s) and, thus, forcing you to show your cards. But if
you do not raise, you will "ante, 37 your life away and go home broke.
Mamet concludes that there is no certainty in poker, only likelihood, and
"the likelihood is that aggression will prevail. 38
Over time, the cards you get in a particular hand, the "luck of the
draw," evens out. Success or failure turns on how well you play all of
the hands, or perhaps on how unobtrusively you cheat, although cheaters
are shunned or worse. Players can set their own ethical standards. But
generally speaking, anything short of cheating--e.g., deviousness or
deceit-is acceptable. Partnerships among players are contrary to the
spirit of the game, but much like bidders' rings at auctions, are difficult
to detect. The "cards speak for themselves," and players who have not
dropped out before the end of the hand must show theirs, providing
information on their style of play to the others.39 David Sklansky adds:
[R]arely if ever is a particular play always right or always wrong.
Your play is affected by the size of the pot [the money-backed chips
to be won, lying in the middle of the table], your position [whether
you bet relatively early or relatively late during a round], the amount
of money they have and you have, the flow of the game, and other,
more subtle factors.4n
A simple game thus becomes quite complex when played by
experts. Consider a decision over "bluffing"4' versus betting a fair hand
34. To "raise" is to bet more than the other players in the current round of betting.
35. To "fold" is to forfeit the hand by leaving the game until the next hand is dealt.
By doing this, a player sacrifices a chance to win the pot of money but also avoids risking
further outlays of capital toward an eventual loss. Applying this terminology, Mamet
argues that folding is the tactic recently employed by the Democratic Party in the U.S.
See Mamet, supra note 33.
36. Or, to put it another way, a Bushian over-aggressiveness, see discussion infra
notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
37. An "ante" is the minimum amount required to play in the hand and, depending
on the variety of poker played, the amount and number of players affected will vary.
38. Mamet, supra note 33. But see SKLANSKY, supra note 25, at 87, 121, 136
(suggesting a raise should be a rare ploy to obtain information or when you expect greater
subsequent improvement in your hand than your opponents will have); id. at 133
("raising is often a better alternative than folding, with calling the worst of the three.").
39. See SKLANSKY, supra note 25, at 137; MOREHEAD & SMITH, supra note 25, at
250, 266.
40. SKLANSKY, supra note 25, at 172-73.
41. "Bluffing" occurs where a player bets while having little or no chance to win if
the player's bet is "called."
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for value; both plays may be appropriate and it is almost never right to do
neither. The decision turns on the players' views of their opponents and
the self-image they want to project for the future. They may want to be
"caught" bluffing to earn even more money later on a good hand because
opponents think they are bluffing again. Those who never bluff, or those
who bluff too much, become losers.42
As a figurative poker player, the Bush Administration bluffs
excessively and in a particular way: acting like a "plunger." Having
more wealth and military power than any other player, the U.S. bets high
at every opportunity, attempting to drive opponents out of the hand by
forcing them to "fold" because they lack the wealth and power
consistently to challenge the U.S. These tactics may even push other
players out of the entire game. The outcome, regardless of the cards the
U.S. holds, is more "pots" won because some opponents will fold even if
they have better cards. These pots are smaller, however, because some
or many potential bettors have been driven out earlier.
Expert players with adequate resources love a plunger like the U.S.
They rely on the plunger to subsidize their lifestyles. Consider Israel and
Egypt. They reap huge foreign and especially military aid "pots" even
though they have nowhere else to go or other viable modes of play.
They even seem to provoke additional bluffs from the U.S., which they
will cheerfully "call," by praising American sloppiness: for example,
betting heavily on a dubious Mid-East "democracy" while supporting
autocrats.43
Unless the developing minor players are very skilled, their play is
often desperate since they are playing with money provided under tight
strictures by the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the World Bank
("WB"), etc. Ironically, some of this money originally comes from the
U.S. which, in this sense, is playing against itself.
In sum, the Bush Administration plays by a failed, perhaps
neoconservative or imperialist, formula. Rather than adjust its play
according to the relevant players and the structure of the particular game
being played-by analogy the size of the ante and the betting rules-the
Administration plows ahead. In contrast, good players are intentionally
inconsistent, bluffing randomly and even seeming to blunder on occasion
in ways which can often be assembled into a winning strategy later. This
42. See SKLANSKY, supra note 25, at 164, 173-76.
43. For example, the November 2005 Forum for the Future in Bahrain, the
conference/centerpiece of Bush's Middle Eastern democracy initiative, collapsed under
"Egypt's insistence that Arab governments should have more control over grants from a
new [U.S.] fund designed to help indigenous pro-democracy groups." William Fisher,
Forum for the (Distant) Future, I.P.S., Nov. 28, 2005, http://ipsnews.net/
news.asp?idnews=31213 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
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is especially effective if it is combined with disparaging, distracting
and/or confusing talk.4 If you are a good player, you know what your
opponents think your cards are and what your opponents think you think
their cards are.45 The Bush Administration cannot be troubled with such
niceties of the game, or even with getting to know their opponents.
Simply deem the North Koreans "inscrutable," for example, and you will
likely lose.
Analytically, the most important point is that the major poker
players recognize their interdependence, which makes the course of play
less fun but more predictable. Economists might call the major players
an "oligopolistic interdependence" to reflect the absence of consistent
collusion among the majors.46 Of course, each major wants to "win"
each hand for itself, and perhaps each major defines what amounts to a
win somewhat differently. But each is keen to avoid the huge costs of
monitoring the others' opportunistic defections from a more formal
"cartel." In other words, interdependence does not necessarily mean
stability in the sense of an inherent tendency toward some equilibrium.
But even more important than winning for the majors is to not lose
in certain ways: they seek "minimax" solutions while avoiding war or
some other painful and costly disasters. Examples of costly disasters
include the Zimmermann Telegram that helped spur World War I, and
putative weapons of mass destruction ("W.M.D.") in Twenty-First
Century Iraq. Saddam offered a puzzle to the gamers, giving only the
most grudging cooperation to U.N. weapons inspectors when he had no
W.M.D. Did he want to conceal the humiliating fact that he had nothing
to hide47 - a hubris surpassing even that of Zimbabwe's Mugabe?
Players recognize that the safest way to avoid disaster while playing
to win is to play by "liberal internationalism" rules.48 Ordinary poker is
a zero-sum game: winners benefit only at the expense of losers. But
"advanced poker" is played in positive-sum ways. Through cooperation
and coordination, all or most major and minor players benefit from a
particular game. Over time, the players display an enhanced trust, a
44. From the world of chess, consider Fisher playing against Spassky; or, with a
tinge of international relations, consider Premier Khrushchev playing against anyone.
45. See SKLANSKY, supra note 25, at 149; id. at 152 ("Many aggressive players...
steal money with bluffs ... but when they get a decent hand, they wind up losing.").
46. Posner argues that "regional successes-including NATO, the EU system, and
NAFTA... are based either on the small number of parties or the dominance of a few
large parties." Posner, supra note 9, at 530. Similarly, the dominance of the major
players helps explain poker outcomes, but an oligopolistic interdependence among them
does not consistently generate the degree of consensus seen in Posner's "successes."
47. See SKLANSKY, supra note 25, at 252, 257; The Trade Game, supra note 13, at
B10.
48. This term is used for want of a better description of anti-Hobbesian rules of
international relations or, in the context of the present model, "advanced poker."
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sense of injustice (particularly but not only as it affects themselves), and
even occasional self-denial. 49  This is especially true when a public,
"non-rival," good can be won: your use of it does not interfere with my
use.5° This efficiency of sharing peaks with "network effects": the more
people who act in the same way, 51 the more useful that good becomes for
everyone. 2
Often, inconsistent or incoherent rules emerge as a side-effect of
ordinary poker, but over time a relatively integrated body of international
law can be built up through the group cooperation of advanced poker.
This is something no major player can do by itself. Multinational
corporations and other nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") like
Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and even the Vikings of our time-
al-Qaeda53-also play advanced poker at its fringes, strengthening global
cooperation for their own purposes. Even though processes may have a
goal-orientation, rounds (or hands) are usually played in cautious and
incremental ways. Effects are occasionally broad and deep over time,
but particular outcomes are more frequently halting and may display
backsliding by players. Planning or preventative action is usually
impossible; as in poker, you must play the cards dealt you under a short
time horizon. Cooperation is never perfect: mistakes happen;
rebelliousness occurs, especially among states taken for granted because
of their long record of cooperation; and major and minor states
sometimes prefer national interests over a liberal internationalist
consensus.
54
49. See The Concrete Savannah, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 2005, at 10 (describing
necessity of interdependence among early humans and concluding "humans are hard-
wired not for logic but for detecting injustice").
50. See The Economics of Sharing, ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 2004, at 71 (explaining the
benefits of sharing through reference to "open source" technology development and peer-
to-peer networks).
51. For example, use Microsoft Windows or act in accord with a particular law.
52. See Snidal, supra note 21, at 122-23; The Concrete Savannah, supra note 49;
The Economics of Sharing, supra note 50, at 51. See also F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 135, 443 (Rand McNally & Co.
1970) (discussing price controls in an oligopolistic market where aggressive actions
provoke aggressive reactions, leading to mutual restraint); KOCH, supra note 23, at 328
(stating in the course of play, oligopolists "outline spheres of interest" which change over
time); ROGER LEROY MILLER, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 343-44 (McGraw-Hill
Book Co. 1978) (discussing George Stigler's implicit collusion among oligopolists,
because explicit collusion is too costly); id. at 352 (citing price wars as evidence of
temporary disruption of communication channels among oligopolists); JEFF PERLOFF &
KLAAS T. VAN'T VELD, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 175 n. 229, 816-17 (2d ed.
1994); Snidal, supra note 21, at 122-23 (describing "rational cooperation" theory); id. at
133 (discussing need for cooperation and coordination through international bargaining).
53. See Niall Ferguson, A World Without Power, FOREIGN POL'Y, July-Aug. 2004, at
23, 38.
54. See SCHERER, supra note 52, at 166; MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR
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A country can be called a "rogue" if it refuses to follow this liberal
internationalism consensus over major issues and for extended periods of
time. If a rogue is relatively poor and powerless, it is simply ignored.55
However, a more powerful rogue gets disciplined by the majors if they
can reach consensus over how to do so.56 Almost always, a relatively
poor and powerless state is best advised to play a different game or by
slightly different means to create a "niche" for itself. The major players
will tolerate this conduct because it does not disrupt their overall
games. 7  Singapore, for example, has become much richer and
somewhat more powerful in specialized ways. Yet the major players
tolerate Singapore because, as a city-state, Singapore lacks the capacity
to become a major player. 8
The game totters along, minor rogues notwithstanding, but its
continuance is threatened, as are the disasters that liberal internationalism
rules are designed to avoid, when a major player becomes a rogue. After
all, the last bout of globalization ended when unresolved political
tensions among the then-majors and their satraps exploded into World
War I. Even sophisticated subsystems may be unable to block the causes
of their own destruction.
167, 170-81 (Yale University Press 2004); Walter Russell Mead, America's Sticky
Power, FOREIGN POL'Y, Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 46, 51; Shann Turnbull, Emergence of a
Global Brain: For and From World Governance (Int'l Inst. for Self-Governance,
Working Paper), available at http://ssm.comi/id=637401 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); see
also JACKSON, supra note 21, at 33 (discussing the tendency to overlook GATT
obligations, especially when these are owed to the poor and powerless); id. at 42
(concluding perfection cannot be expected among players with diverse interests); id. at
156 (revealing the tactic of erecting barriers which cost your opponents more than they
do you); KOCH, supra note 23, at 350 (stating information about future states of the
market is not free, and therefore, neither are decisions about what to do; most players
simply follow the behavior of the major players); But see Annan Says US Should Support
Millennium Development Goals, REUTERS, Sept. 5, 2004, http://www.eyeontheun.org
(select "Search" search "Annan Says US Should Support Millennium Development
Goals") (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (quoting U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
sentiment that states must practice "give and take" or "in the end [they] can't be
effective" and an effort to achieve "consensus at all costs" creates "191 vetoes").
55. Consider, for example, Zimbabwe and the resulting human rights crisis there.
56. We see the failure of consensus-driven discipline in the international reaction to
Iran's nuclear ambitions or oil-rich Sudan's deplorable human rights record.
57. See KOCH, supra note 23, at 350; SCHERER, supra note 52, at 10, 209 (revealing
that in an oligopolistic market, limited deviations operate to inhibit retaliation); Sebastian
Mallaby, Editorial, Making Globalization Work, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2004, at A17,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search "1987-
Current" for "'Making Globalization Work') (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (arguing
although globalization has survived terrorism and weak international institutions, the
growing tensions require attention and commitment from the major players).
58. Contrast the major players' reaction to Singapore with their attention to India,
Brazil, Indonesia, Argentina, and South Africa. The majors watch the latter group
carefully because they have the capacity to become major players themselves.
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The Bush Administration arguably turned the U.S. into a major-
player rogue by refusing to make important game moves under liberal
internationalism rules59 and thus distorting the goal-orientation of
59. For example, the U.N. supported the U.S. in the Korean War, Iraqi War 1 (1991),
the re-installation of Aristide in Haiti (1994), and helped the U.S. settle the Suez Crisis
(1956), as well as the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). See Steven Schlesinger, The U.N.
Under Siege, MAXIMS NEWS.COM, Mar. 17, 2005, http://www.maximsnews.corn/
2005schlesingerl 7march.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2007). Bush the Younger thus came as
a shock to foreign leaders familiar with Bush the Elder's and Clinton's, admittedly rather
tepid, liberal internationalism. In 2002, John Brady Giesing, a career diplomat resigning
over the Younger's foreign policies, ably summarized the changes taking place: "We are
straining beyond its limits an international system we built with such toil and treasure, a
web of laws, treaties, organizations, and shared values that sets limits to our foes far more
effectively than it ever constrained America's ability to defend its interests." Paul H.
Brietzke, September 11 and American Law (Valparaiso Univ., Working Paper), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=453522 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007)
(quoting Geising). In rapid succession, the current Bush Administration repudiated the
Kyoto Global Warming Treaty, the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, and U.S. participation in
the International Criminal Court; coercive "agreements" were subsequently wrung from a
number of minor players to keep U.S. citizens out of this Court. The U.S. even managed
to lose its perennial seat on the U.N. Human Rights Commission, and the invasive U.S.A.
PATRIOT Act gave the U.S. a bad name among human rights advocates because it
encouraged rights abusers. A common "anti-terrorism" cause was made with dictators in
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, while more reliable allies in "old" Europe were
ignored. Zbigniew Brzezinski attributes such strange policies to a blind fear that
periodically verges on panic. See Robin Wright, Middle East Democracy Summit Ends in
Rancor, WASH. POST, Nov. 12 2005, 9:38 am, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/l1/12/AR2005111200464.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2007)
(quoting Brzezinski). See AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE 8-9 (Adam Bellow ed., 2003);
September 11, supra note 59; Ellen Goodman, A Post-Bush Mind Set, WASH. POST, Oct.
30, 2004, at A19, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search
Archives"; search "1987-Current" for "'A Post-Bush Mind Set').
Having re-invented the doctrine of pre-emption as a kind of anticipatory retaliation,
Bush marketed Iraqi War II as if it were a soft drink or toothpaste, adopting "Orwellian
flourishes": "in order to be relevant," the U.N. Security Council (that was awaiting
reports on W.M.D.s that turned out not to be in Iraq) "must become irrelevant" by
allowing "the U.S. to evaluate . . . risk and respond in its sole discretion." Michael
Kinsley, Editorial, Whose Authority?, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2003, at A37, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for
"'Michael Kinsley"' follow to results page "22"). See Jean-Maria Guehenno, Letter to
the Editor, Abuse by Peacekeepers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, available at
http://nytimes.com (search "Guehenno") (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
Bush added fuel to foreigners' fires over detention and torture at Guantanamo Bay
and Abu Ghraib. Bush shocked even his cynical critics by appointing, without Senate
consent, the abrasive John Bolton as U.N. Ambassador, because apparently, Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice did not want Bolton as her Deputy. Bolton is a darling of the
neoconservatives who would dissolve the U.N. or, at the least, force Kofi Annan's
resignation. Bolton's influence over foreign policy is an increasingly permanent factor in
the U.S. He led the U.S. repudiation of several treaties, alienated North Korea and
opposed E.U. efforts to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions. He refers to the U.N. as a "rusting
hulk," opposes its peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, and denies that the U.S. has
a legal obligation to pay U.N. dues. Bush nominated another neoconservative icon, Paul
Wolfowitz, as the new WB President. Diplomat and a senior Defense Department
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governance without a government. The U.S. uses radically offensive
game-moves. 60  For example, Bush feels unable to wait until the next
terrorist attack so he is trying to change international law and politics, the
"game rules" for purposes of the present model, to enhance U.S. national
security. However, Bush now finds himself trying to reach out to a
world dismayed by the foreign policy choices of his first term. This
more conciliatory and multilateral approach can be seen in his September
2005 speech to the U.N. World Summit.61
An inability to understand this global dismay is typified by William
Smullen: "It is clear that the American brand has been badly damaged.
I'm not suggesting we have to change our policy. '62  The Security
Council's vote failing to support Bush's Iraqi War II was a moment of
defiance, relevance, and global significance. Nonetheless, the moment
soon collapsed under concentrated U.S. pressure. In sum, Bush's
official, Wolfowitz is a major architect of Iraqi War II. See Glenn Kessler & Colum
Lynch, Critic of U.N. Named Envoy, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2005, at Al, available at
http://www.washintonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for
"'Critic of U.N. Named Envoy') (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Charles Lane, Mexicans on
Death Row to Get Hearings, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2005, at A2, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for
"Mexicans on Death Row Get Hearings") (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Charles Lane, US.
Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for
"'U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases') (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Colum Lynch,
U.S. Drops Abortion Issue at U.N. Conference, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2005, at A13,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search "1987-
Current" for "'U.S. Drops Abortion Issue at U.N. Conference') (last visited Nov. 3,
2007); Brian McNamara, Editorial, Undercutting Protections for Americans Abroad,
WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2005, at B6, available at http://www.washintonpost.com (select
"Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for "Brian McNamara"); Susan E. Rice,
Editorial, Tough Love or Tough Luck?, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2005, at A15, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for
"'Tough Love or Tough Luck"') (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Ian Williams, Real U.N.
Reform, THE NATION, Dec. 27, 2004, 6; The View From Abroad, ECONOMIST, Feb. 19,
2005, at 24 (relaying a Special Report on Anti-Americanism). But see Condi's
Challenge, ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 2005, at 42 ("there are signs that the administration is
beginning to count the costs of its first-term policy."). "Neoconservatives see Etiropeans
as 'a bunch of duplicitous, atheistic wimps, whose moral laxity is leading them to an
inevitable and richly deserved doom.'" The European Dreamers, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18,
2004, at 78. In sum, the Bush Administration continues to fuel nationalist claims hostile
to U.S. interests, and repudiates or ignores key international law principles. But, with
some justification, neoconservatives take credit for democracy in the Middle East.
60. See discussion supra notes 43-45, 59 and accompanying text.
61. See generally George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Speech to the U.N. World
Summit (Sept. 14, 2005), http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/
WS05_usaO50914eng2-1.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
62. Glenn Kessler & Robin Wright, Report: U.S. Image in Bad Shape-Hughes Set
to Begin Public Diplomacy, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2005, at A16, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for
"'U.S. Image in Bad Shape"') (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
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bungling comes close to Nixon's thirty-five year-old nightmare of
turning the U.S. into a "pitiful, helpless giant" unable to subdue a rag-tag
Iraqi insurgency which has no major external sources of support.63
Rather, intellectually-bankrupt tactics seem to involve maneuvers such as
driving lightly-armored U.S. vehicles down Iraqi roads to see who shoots
or where planted explosives are located.
Russia, under Vladimir Putin, similarly leans toward rogue state
status.64 Putin's purported emulation of Bush's "democracy" and "rule
of law" are now muted by a desire to squeeze out any political
opposition, to claw back powers Yeltsin devolved to the regions and to
63. Anatol Lieven, Liberal Hawk Down, THE NATION, Oct. 25, 2004, at 29, 34,
available at http://www.thenation.com/ (search "'Liberal Hawk Down"') (last visited
Nov. 3, 2007). See Thalif Deen, Despite Strictures, U.N. Chief Refuses to Yield, I.P.S.,
Sept. 7, 2005, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=30179 (last visited Nov. 3,
2007); David Ignatius, Editorial, They're Not Going to Like Us, WASH. POST, Sept. 23,
2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search
"1987-Current" for "'They're Not Going to Like Us') (last visited Nov. 3, 2007)
(wanting to be loved, Americans assume our deep unpopularity is a "communications
problem" to be treated by such things as appointing Karen Hughes or sending more
troops to Iraq); Glenn Kessler, This Year, Bush Takes a Different Tone With the U.N.,
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2005, at A08, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com (select
"Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for "'This Year, Bush Takes"') (last visited
Nov. 3, 2007); Bennett Roth, In U.N. Speech, Bush Urges Two-Pronged Fight on Terror,
Hous. CHRON., Sept. 15, 2005, at 9.
64. Outsiders understand little about Russia. Having exaggerated the extent to
which Yeltsin established liberal democracy, they exaggerate the extent of Putin's
backpedaling towards authoritarianism. Admittedly, Putin has fought a brutal, human-
rights-abusing war against nationalists in Chechnya (a separatist province), justifying this
as a move against "terrorism"-the same justification Bush uses in Iraq. Russia's
political meddling in Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Abkashia (a province in Georgia), and
Trans-Dniester (a separatist region of Moldova) will almost certainly continue. But the
ex-Soviet Muslim "-stans," e.g., Kazakhstan and Kyrgystan, are slowly drifting out of the
Russian orbit while adopting a variety of anti-democratic practices. The Baltic countries
are already in NATO, and the Transcaucasian region is unstable and bloody because local
rulers pursue ethnic nationalism claims. See Rachel Denber, Beyond Ukraine, a Grim
Picture, THE INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 28, 2004, available at www.hrw.org (search
"Beyond Ukraine") (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Jackson Diehl, Russia's Unchecked
Ambitions, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2004, at A21, available at www.washingtonpost.com
(select "Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for "'Russia's Unchecked
Ambitions"') (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Peter Finn, Kyrgyzstan Opposition Routed at
Polls, Process Faulted, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2005, at A7, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for
"'Kyrgyzstan Opposition"') (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Charles Krauthammer, Why Only
in Ukraine?, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2004, at A27, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for
"'Why Only In Ukraine') (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Michael McFaul, Book Review,
Reform and Retreat, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2005, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for
"'Reform and Retreat') (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Bleak House, ECONOMIST, Jan. 15,
2005, at 80; An Empire's Fraying Edge, ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2005, at 21; Vladimir III,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 2004, at 46.
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control the media more tightly. One author, writing for the Economist,
sees traces of a Leninism in this:
Russian foreign policy is still warped by the phantom pain of its lost
empire. The government still has too little regard for private
property, too often shows a reflexive distrust of business [having
repeatedly snubbed lax IMF and WB policies concerning Russia],
and has an inflated idea of the state's proper role in the econom y-as
recent developments in Russia's energy sector demonstrate .... 5
Many E.U. and U.N. officials are appalled by U.S. and Russian
behavior, and a few commentators see Ukraine as the kick off in a new
Cold War. 66 Meanwhile, many minor players are seeking cover because
they fear the onset of disasters and reallocations of power that such
disruptions make more likely in an advanced poker game. These
disruptions, in a game where the rule is governance without government,
also disrupt relatively settled political and economic expectations. Self-
fulfilling prophecies of a lack of cooperation can lead to a potentially
dangerous level of instability and to even greater uncertainty and
complexity. But the poker games have been running within consensus
borders since the end of World War II, and most nation-states have
developed buffers against threatened international instabilities. These
buffers may prove effective for long periods: perhaps even until Bush
and Putin leave office.
The Chinese seem faintly bemused by Bush's and Putin's carryings-
on while positioning themselves to take advantage of any future chaos.
China is increasingly projecting itself as a global power, spending a great
deal on a leaner, meaner, more technologically-adept military.67 For
example, a Chinese-Russian joint military exercise, Peace 2005, was a
classical battle set-piece with Russia using the modern equipment China
lacks, perhaps to awe the Chinese and to make U.S. dominance in the
region seem even more tenuous. A very good poker player, China cozies
up to an anxious Russia and Central Asian states. Meanwhile, the U.S.
schmoozes India and tries to persuade Japan to become more assertive
towards China and Russia. China's insatiable quest for oil and gas has it
65. Pickled Ideologues: Bury Lenin, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 2005, at 12. See Jim
Hoagland, Can Russia Stem This Tide?, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2005, at A23, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for
"'Can Russia Stem This Tide') (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Andrew Osborn & Anne
Penketh, Putin Stresses Russia is 'Equal' With the E.U. States, INDEP., Oct. 5, 2005, at
2 1; Beyond Siberia, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2005, at 45.
66. See discussion supra note 65.
67. See Dieter Farwick, China is Flexing Its Military Might, WORLD SECURITY
NETWORK, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id= 11937
(last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
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competing with India and dealing with countries blacklisted by the U.S.
as troublesome: Myanmar, Sudan, and Iran to name a few. Persistent
U.S. complaints about Chinese human rights violations, inadequate
protections of intellectual property, and overvaluing its currency to boost
exports68 have been met with only lukewarm "cosmetic" Chinese
responses.69 Notwithstanding China's continuing economic boom, some
commentators see China's "socialist," or "planned," market economy as
the ultimate contradiction in terms. A consumer choice without political
choice is believed to spawn corruption, cronyism, and a growth in the
number and scale of public protests.70 In any event, this "harmonious
society"-the new buzzword in China-is under threat from a galloping
inequality in the distribution of wealth.71
The E.U.'s attempts at achieving a common foreign policy and
international law reform policy have only met a modest degree of
success. In one article, the Economist goes too far in playing down the
68. It should be noted that many of the proceeds stemming from China's boosted
exports buy the U.S. treasury liabilities that finance huge U.S. deficits.
69. See Paul Blustein, U.S. Urges IMF Crackdown on Currency, WASH. POST, Sept.
24, 2005, at DOI, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search
Archives"; search "1987-Current" for "'U.S. Urges IMF Crackdown') (last visited Nov.
3, 2007); The Dragon Comes Along, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 2005, at 25.
70. See The Cauldron Boils, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 2005, at 61.
71. See Antoaneta Bezlova, Great Leap to Help Rural China, I.P.S., Oct. 14, 2005,
www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=30559 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (noting the
Chinese Public Security Ministry admitted "that there were 74,000 serious protests [in
2004], involving 3.7 million people, up from... 58,000 in 2003); id (informing that by
October 2005, twenty-three policemen were killed during "riots" while 1,826 were
injured); Niall Ferguson, Op-Ed., The Man-Eater of Asia's Tigers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3,
2005; Peter Goodwin, China's Transformation, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2005, 10:00 am,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2005/11/29/D120051129
00326.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2008) (maintaining China's economy will stumble at
some point given "rickety" banking, water and energy shortages, social instability, the
wastage of capital and "white elephants"); Jonathan Watts, Chinese General Warns of
Nuclear Risk to U.S., THE GUARDIAN, July 16, 2005, at 17 (informing that in a statement
presumably calculated by Government, a Chinese General threatened to "nuke" hundreds
of U.S. cities if the U.S. intervened over Taiwan); Edward Cody, Beijing Pledges to
Focus on Income Disparities, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2005, at A12, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for
"'Edward Cody"'; follow to results page "28") (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (quoting, with
no reference to growing protests, a communiqu6 stating: "We have to solve the
contradictions of the people.., we have to face.., the most crucial, direct and
unrealistic problems"); id. (explaining no countervailing power such as an independent
court system will be tolerated, and "the most important thing is to strengthen the ability
and leadership of the party."); Confucius Did Not Say That The Red China of Two Nai've
Guys, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 16, 2005, 8:19 AM (quoting Shao Ming: "China used to be
only one colour-red[, but now it] is many colours"); The Dragon Comes Along, supra
note 69, at 25 (stating Chinese leader Hu will ask Bush to treat China as a "market
economy"--thus making the application of U.S. anti-dumping measures more difficult-
though the request is unlikely to be granted).
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E.U.'s role in international relations and law by likening it to the role of a
Greek chorus, commenting or reacting with "horror or praise,.., but
playing no part in the" action.72 Bush is seen as this play's tragic
protagonist, "hurrying to his doom and reckless of the consequences of
his actions. 73 Some neoconservative Americans return the favor, seeing
E.U. members as too disorganized, "cowardly, cynical and decadent to
support America's courageous and idealistic mission... . Admittedly,
France is often prickly and seeks to dominate consensus. On the other
hand, Blair's Britain was often the outsider of Europe, trying to play
poker like Bush. Europe's ideological wounds are slow to heal, and the
failure of the new E.U. Constitution in two referenda exposes a
legitimation crisis within Europe. In addition to hiving off Britain, Bush
managed to divide the E.U. further over Iraq: Italy, Poland and
(temporarily) Spain came over to Bush's "coalition of the willing."
Despite such disunity on some issues, the E.U. was one of the few parties
that backed the World Summit draft document as a whole. In
comparison, the U.S. proposed seven hundred amendments to the draft,
while Russia, Cuba, Pakistan, Algeria, Iran and others also sought
extensive changes.75
72. Europe's Cassandra Complex, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2005, at 54 (citing Bob
Kagan). Like the E.U., a Greek chorus often supports the "law"-as in Sophocles's
Antigone. See id.
73. Id. at 56.
74. Liberal Hawk Down, supra note 63, at 34.
75. See ANATOL LIEVEN, AMERICA RIGHT OR WRONG PAGE (Oxford Univ. Press
2004); Stefania Bianchi, Amid Budget Spat, E. U. Searches for the Big Picture, I.P.S., Oct.
25, 2005, www.ipsnews.net/intema.asp?idnews=30769 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007)
(quoting Alasdair Murray: "all EU countries face similar challenges to their social models
such as aging populations, low-wage competition from Asia and high unemployment in
some areas"); id. (maintaining we must reach a policy consensus before attempting other
reforms); Stefania Bianchi, U.N. Summit Being Written OffAlready, I.P.S., Sept. 21, 2005
(explaining Luis Morago, head of Oxform, Brussels urges European leaders to go further
on poverty reduction and arms control); Stephen Castle, China Says Brussels Does Not
Care About Job Losses in Assault on Economic Policy, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 7, 2005
(Chirac stresses the need for an E.U. united front on globalization in "classic Chirac:
defining Europe and France as the same thing"); Romulo, supra note 17, at 13-14; To
Doha's Rescue, ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 2005, at 13 (stating that Peter Mandelson, the
European commissioner for trade, "needs approval from national governments if he is to
go as far as his American counterpart"); similarly, some negotiating points in the U.S.
must be confirmed by congressional enactment or Senate Ratification.
On the E.U. as a major player, see Morton Abramowitz & Heather Hurlburt,
Editorial, Where to Start with Europe, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2004, at A23, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for
"'Where to Start With Europe') (last visited Feb. 1, 2008) (reviewing TIMOTHY GARTON
ASH, AMERICA, EUROPE, AND THE SURPRISING FUTURE OF THE WEST (Random House
2004), and T.R. REID, THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE (THE PENGUIN PRESS 2004)); id.
(noting the Europeans' "bickering and boredom: and anxiety over 'feeling dwarfed by the
U.S. hyperpuissance.'); id. (Ash shows how disunity is "one of the things we in the West
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The European Commission calls the U.N.'s Millennium
Development Goals ("MDGs") 76 "the core" of E.U. development policy,
the "new ... consensus" of "a global player. 77 An NGO official notes
that the E.U. claims "moral leadership over MDGs," in what we might
call an important bet in a major poker game, but E.U. countries must
"deliver on their promises" through collective action to be "credible."
78
Arguably, E.U. performance during the Doha Round of WTO
negotiations 79 saps its credibility.
The Canadian Louise Frechette, a recently resigned Deputy-
General, calls the U.N. the complex center of just about everything since
the end of the Cold War-the center of high ambitions and often higher
expectations. Outcomes have been both "notable successes and
shattering failures" that rarely stem from the U.N. simply walking away
from a problem.8 0 As adaptable and evolving reflections of the world,
the members of the U.N. "family 81 have an international legal
personality without approximating the organs of a world government.
These family members can participate in international relations
independent of their member nation-states, and can create independent
customary international law. But like the E.U., the U.N. is a major
player only when adequate power and resources are delegated by
members after the requisite consensus is mustered. After which, the
U.N. can build its own distinctive power: the ability to legitimate or de-
legitimate political, social, economic, and even military actions.
Lawyers as lawyers, like poker games, organize around this legitimation
rubric because, inter alia, rules of international law are often created
during the course of play. Some argue that such games serve to conceal
have in common."); id (Ash shows how "building a future in defiance of the other-the
Soviet Union in the past, America today, perhaps in Islam or China tomorrow-is neither
sustainable nor ennobling."); Editorial, Backward in China, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2004,
at A22, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search
"1987-Current" for "'Backward in China') (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
76. See app. infra.
77. Stefania Bianchi, E.U. Urged to Show Its Muscle, I.P.S., Sept. 14, 2005
(emphasis added).
78. Olivia Ward, Frechette's U.N. Challenge; World Body Battered Over the Recent
Oil-For-Food Scandal Office is Now Hitting Its Stride, Says Deputy Secretary General,
TORONTO STAR, Sept. 24, 2005, at A14. See discussion infra note 194 and accompanying
text (discussing the E.U.'s behavior over the Doha Round of WTO negotiations).
79. See discussion infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
80. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES XXV, xxxv (Cambridge Univ. Press Vol. I
2005); Globalization, Nationalism, & Human Rights, supra note 8; Evans, supra note 8,
at 1054-56; in a 2003 Poll, the U.N.'s "standing" declined in the twenty participating
countries. Standing declined in the U.S. because the U.N. did not sanction Iraqi War II,
and in the nineteen others because it could not prevent it.
81. The U.N. "family" includes international conferences.
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processes of domination, however. Consider the exercise of power
"markets," another game rubric thought legitimate by the U.S.,
increasingly by China, and tolerated by many developing countries as a
necessary evil under strictures imposed by the WTO, the IMF, the WB,
etc.
82
A major function of the U.N. is the collective empowerment of the
relatively powerless. For example, the U.N. sometimes plays poker
hands as a major acting on behalf of minor players by offering a forum
where minors' concerns and arguments can be aired, as well as a solution
to some collective action problems. This can be seen in a U.N.
representation of the sometimes-diffuse interests of the 118-member
Non-Aligned Movement, more powerful during the Cold War and
currently led by Malaysia, India, and South Africa. This Movement is
frequently ignored by widely-circulated media. Likewise, an even less
well-known Group of Seventy-Seven, composed of 134 members and
currently chaired by Jamaica, and the Group of Twenty-Four, formed in
1971 to unify developing countries' positions on monetary policy and
development finance, remain invincible to the media. At the other end of
the player spectrum, Bush's neoconservative surrogates, such as Senator
Norm Coleman and formerly, Representative Tom DeLay and
Representative Henry Hyde, created an existential crisis when they
picked up Bush's cudgels for use against another lame duck, Secretary-
General Annan, over what amounts to an oil-for-food corruption
sidebar83 to the World Summit. This crisis set two of the world's most
impressive "spin machines" into motion, and the forces of liberal
internationalism prevailed over the neocons. China, Russia, 105 other
states, the E.U., plus the New York Times, Washington Post, National
Public Radio, and the BBC supported the "bold reformer" Annan as the
best Secretary-General since Dag Hammarskjold, although some see this
as rather faint praise.84
Like fairies, paper money or perhaps the Soviet Union, the U.N.
would cease to exist, at least as a major player, if people stopped
82. Editorial, United Nations to the Rescue (of Itself), CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Sept. 15, 2005, at 8 (U.N.'s "power lies in setting norms of behavior and then using a
majority voice to persuade or shame norm-breakers to follow suit"); Ronald Saunders,
Editorial, Small States Need a Stronger U.N., CARIBBEAN NET NEWS, Sept. 27, 2005;
Martin Walker, Bush v. Annan: Taming the United Nations, 22 WORLD POL'Y J. 9 (Spring
2005).
83. See discussion infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
84. Simon Chesterman, Op-Ed., Duty Pulls Annan in Two Directions, INT. HERALD
TRIB., Sept. 9, 2005, at 6; Thalif Deen, Post-Summit Dilemma of Promises and Delivery,
I.P.S., Sept. 27, 2005; Sebastian Mallaby, Bush's Missed U.N. Opportunity, WASH. POST,
Sept. 12, 2005, at A19; Schlesinger, supra note 59; Frechette's UN. Challenge, supra
note 78 (maintaining that the U.N. is looked upon as a necessary, and often most
competent partner for players major and minor).
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believing in it. This, along with the curbing of funding, seems the tactic
attempted by U.S. neoconservatives, but it is wildly unrealistic. The
U.N. currently oversees eighteen peacekeeping operations, using eight
thousand troops. Would the U.S. want to pay for and pacify these
problematic hot spots by itself?.85 Rather, should not the U.S. want to
reform U.N. institutions so as to strengthen them for this purpose, out of
a national self-interest, so that the U.S. can concentrate on playing poker
games with greater pay-offs? But this was not to be. Accurately
forecasting the outcome from the September 2005 World Summit,
Samantha Powers noted that the "U.N.'s imperfections were manifest
from its creation. It was built upon... obvious contradictions....
Whatever they can agree upon [at the Summit] is sure to be disappointing
and will be derided.,
86
III. Summitry
For the U.N., "success never seems to resonate as much as
failure. '87 Failures include disasters in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia,88
U.S. circumvention of the Security Council action over Iraqi War II,
sexual abuse by U.N. troops in the Congo and elsewhere, and corruption
in the Oil-for-Food program.89  It might be thought that the U.N. is
ineffective because we still face war, injustice, and poverty. Yet so far,
we have avoided World War III, in no small measure because of the
international law rules governing the parties' poker games. Moreover,
more people now live in countries where freedoms are protected to some
extent by law. The U.N. has run elections in ninety countries,
peacekeeping operations in sixty, helped resolve 170 regional conflicts,
and assisted in the decolonization of eighty countries. Such activities are
the primary cause for a forty percent decline in armed conflicts since the
end of the Cold War. The U.N. imposes sanctions on member-
miscreants, establishes international criminal tribunals and then
convinces members to turn over potential defendants. The High
Commission for Refugees aided fifty million refugees from war, famine
or persecution. The International Atomic Energy Agency 9° searches for
W.M.D. and has created security measures for one hundred nuclear
85. See Samantha Power, To Save the World From Hell, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE,
Sept. 2005, available at http://mondediplo.com/2005/09/04reforming (last visited Nov. 3,
2007). Sixty years ago, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. said that the U.N. won't "bring us to
heaven," but it might "save us from hell." Id.
86. Id.
87. Editorial, Short-Lived Celebration, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at 10.
88. See id.
89. See discussion infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
90. Winner of the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize.
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facilities in seventy countries. Furthermore, the World Health
Organization wiped out smallpox and markedly reduced polio. 9'
Past reform efforts often came after war, and were spurred by the
vision and political will of the leaders of particular nation-states. The
current round of reform turns this process on its head by trying to create
political will internally in order to make the U.N. more effective. The
fear is that if some U.N. institutions "under perform," the U.N. as a
whole will be unable to meet new threats and opportunities. 92 Thus, in
preparation for the 2005 Summit, Secretary-General Annan named a
Panel of High-Level Experts to report on issues of peace and security,93
while economists led by Jeffrey Sachs considered how the commitments
made at the 2000 Millennium Summit could best be implemented.94 In
March 2005, Annan synthesized their key recommendations in his
manifesto, In Larger Freedom.95 The Secretary-General deliberately set
an ambitious and tightly-packaged agenda, anticipating the watering-
down and fragmentation that inevitably results from negotiations, or
poker games played, over such an agenda. Pakistan, which merits some
of the blame for the eventual reform failures, feared that such a "heavy"
agenda would lead to collapse, leaving the Summit with no tangible
result.96 However, this fear was never realized of course because poker,
and especially advanced poker, rules are designed to avoid collapse/no-
result at almost any cost.
91. See Chesterman, supra note 84; Kathryn Horvat & Pat Shea, Op-Ed., The U.N.:
60 Years and Still Counting, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 22, 2005, at AA6; Shashi Tharoor, In
Order to Redeem, the United Nations Must Be Redeemed, THE LEB. DAILY STAR, Sept.
15, 2005; U.N. is Faced With New Challenges, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Oct. 24, 2005.
But see Michael Glennon, supra note 21, at 613 (decrease in violence "might have been
the result of... growing economic integration, stronger alliances, military deterrence,
more influential N.G.O.s, the reportage of the mass media ... or merely a transnational
sense of horror over the barbarism of war).
92. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Urges Reform Process Forward, Speech to the
World Summit, (Sept. 15, 2005), www.un.org/news/press/docs/2005/sgsm10090.doc.htm
(last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
93. See Guehenno, supra note 59 (stating that the U.N. investigated 221
peacekeepers over sexual abuse in the Congo, repatriated eighty-eight soldiers, some of
whom are being prosecuted in their home country, and fired ten civilians); Tharoor, supra
note 91.
94. See generally JEFFREY SACHS, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL PLAN
TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (Earthscan 2004).
95. See The Secretary-General, Report: In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N.Doc.
A/59/2005 (March 21, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/ (last visited
Nov. 3, 2007).
96. Brown, supra note 16; Colum Lynch & Glenn Keasler, U.N. Scales Back Plan of
Action, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2005, at A6, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com
(select "Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for "'U.N. Scales Back Plan of
Action') (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Schlesinger, supra note 59.
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Many echoed Annan over the essential interrelatedness of the
development, security (including the suppression of terrorism), and
respect for human rights, all to be achieved through U.N. reforms. But
the U.S., Russia to a lesser extent, and relatively few minor players
persisted in pulling at any snag or frayed edge that emerged when
Annan's proposals were put under negotiating stress. In effect, these
players chose to play many separate poker games, not of the advanced
variety, for narrow, short-term, and sometimes misperceived gains. A
U.N. culture of inaction absent consensus enabled these players to shape
non-reform outcomes as the economists' "holdouts"--veto groups whose
existence is made possible by the extraordinarily high "transaction costs"
of U.N. reform. Annan's hope for an idealized grand social contract,
stated alternatively, a single, idealized advanced poker game, was
dashed: developed countries genuinely working to alleviate Third World
poverty in exchange for developing countries' support for the reforms
developed countries sought. But Annan was careful not to challenge the
permanent members of the Security Council-those with veto power or,
roughly, what are referred to as the major poker players here-since their
power and consensus is essential to any successful reform.97 Had the
U.S. stood with the other majors, would it have been possible to isolate
Russia and eliminate the minor-player holdouts? The logic of poker
suggests "yes."
The Summit, "the 900 pound gorilla,... the largest in history,"
98
occurred in September 2005 when approximately 170 nation-state
leaders gathered for a "once-in-a-generation" opportunity for U.N.
reform9 9 in New York. Mark Malloch Brown recalls that on the morning
the Summit opened, negotiations were "heading off the rails," with 140
passages and twenty-seven issues still left undecided.100 Annan and the
transitional General Assembly Presidents took "a high-risk gamble" by
97. Edith M. Lederer, Leaders Fall Short on Larger Goals in Effort to Fight Poverty,
Terrorism at U.N. Summit, ASSOC. PRESS, SEPT. 17,2005; Monique Chemillier-Gendreau,
The Alternative U.N., LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Sept. 2005, available at
http://mondediplo.com/2005/09/05securitycouncil (last visited Nov. 3, 2007). The
holdout "spoiler countries" variously include the U.S., Russia, Myanmar, Turkmenistan,
Belarus, India, Vietnam, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran. See
generally Alan Beattie, Poorer Nations in the Spotlight for Trade Talks, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005; Nick Wadhams, General Assembly OKs Compromise Document,
Assoc. PRESS, Sept. 13, 2005. The people deserve better than this disingenuous horse
trading; there is no evidence of the political will to stop, e.g., another Rwanda. Id.
98. Olivia Ward, UN. Faces the Fight of its Life, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 12, 2005, at
A8.
99. Id.
100. See UN. Summit Leaders to Adopt Weak Document, Assoc. PRESS, Sept. 14,
2005, available at www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/14/content_477840.htm
(last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
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deleting contentious matters from the draft Summit outcome, adopting
alternative language they thought could win approval, and submitting a
"clean" copy to members who then adopted it quickly. 10' Everyone had
to compromise, 102 something the advanced poker model predicts, as it
does the narrow limitations on such compromises, which are usually
composed of diverse national interests and desires to "win."
In any event, Annan's proposals were criticized for ignoring the
complexities of a global society and for the impossibility of reform
where the major powers refuse to give up their prerogatives. Secretary-
General Annan did much to open up U.N. processes to NGOs,
10 3
arguably in an effort to solidify advanced poker as the dominant
international game. But NGOs strongly objected to a lack of control
over the Summit agenda as well as the lack of access to closed-door
negotiations among nation-states. In contrast, the Helsinki Summit and
the Clinton Global Initiative, held just before and just after the U.N.
Summit respectively, made room for NGO participation in the "intense
dialogue" no longer possible at the U.N. "because of highly ritualistic
structures, protocol and conflict avoidance."10 4 The "multi-stakeholder"
Helsinki process will go forward under two NGOs, the Celso Furtado
Centre in Sao Paolo, Brazil, and the Brookings Institution in
Washington, D.C.
10 5
NGO officials also came up with specific criticisms of Summit
outcomes. For example, one critic objected stating "we wanted a bold
agenda to tackle poverty but instead we have a brochure showcasing past
commitments" and omitting, e.g., women's rights issues.10 6  Only
democratic, "comprehensive, radical and transparent reform of the U.N.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Among the NGOs Annan tried to open processes to were corporations, as
"stakeholders" in civil society.
104. Glenn Kessler, Clinton Gathers World Leaders, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2005, at
A2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search Archives"; search
"1987-Current" for "'Clinton Gathers World Leaders"') (last visited Nov. 3, 2007)
(quoting Richard Holbrook, U.N. Ambassador under Clinton). See also Sanjay Suri,
Development: NGOs Talk, Governments Listen, I.P.S., Sept. 7, 2005,
www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=30160 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (reporting the
presence of seventy governments and 600 NGOs at Helsinki); Chemillier-Gendreau,
supra note 97; Coate, supra note 1; Maggie Farley, U.N. Reform Bid Exposes its Woes,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at A3.
105. See Sanjay Suri, Development: Straight Talk Expected at Post-Helsinki
Roundtables, I.P.S., Sept. 14, 2005, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=30224 (last
visited Nov. 3, 2007).
106. U.N. Reform Agenda Watered Down, CNN, Sept. 14, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/14/un.reform/index.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
See discussion infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text. Oxfam's 4,000 partner
organizations in seventy countries promote dignity and development.
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will enable this system to fulfil [sic] its historical role .... "" The
"watered-down" language of the "cleverly-crafted" Summit outcome
document shows the U.N. becoming "the biggest talk-but not act-
shop in the world."' 08  The Mauritius Ambassador speaks of a "least
common denominator" Summit outcome document'0 9 which, according
to at least one political scientist, will not move the world toward
promoting human security. 110 There was a leadership vacuum, which is
what the poker analogy would lead us to expect. Clare Short finds
"depression and mistrust,"'' which we might see as attitudes making
advanced poker less likely. According to Mary Robinson, the U.N. "had
its bluff called.... ,2 Venezuela's Foreign Minister objected to the
"anti-democratic" negotiation process, especially to the fact that the
outcome document had to be approved before it was translated into
Spanish. 13 However, one journalist writing for the Economist finds the
document "not wholly devoid of substance."
'
"
14
107. Elisa Marincola, Summit Ignores People's U.N., I.P.S., Sept. 16, 2005,
http://other-news.info/index.php?p=l 153 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (quoting Antonio
Papisca of the University of Padua's Centre for Human Rights). See also Haider Rizvi,
Anger at Washington Simmers on Eve of UN. Meet, I.P.S., Sept. 1, 2005,
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=30113 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
108. Thalif Deen, March Toward MDGs Leaving Millions Behind, I.P.S., Sept. 16,
2005, http://other-news.info/index.php?p= 1153 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (quoting
Saradha Iyer, of Malaysia's Third World Network). See Frechette's U.N. Challenge,
supra note 78 (stating the Summit document is "heavy on rhetoric and light on
substance").
109. Colum Lynch, U.N. Members Undercut Annan 's Quest for Reform, WASH. POST,
Sept. 13, 2005, at A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com (select "Search
Archives"; search "1987 - Current" for "'U.N. Members Undercut Annan's') (last
visited Nov. 3, 2007) (quoting Ambassador Jagdish Koonjul). See David Usbom, U.N. 's
Reform Plans Hang in Balance as Vital Summit Begins, THE INDEP., Sept. 15, 2005,
available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politics/article312469.ece (last visited
Nov. 3, 2007) (quoting Mark Malloch Brown) ("we always knew we wouldn't get the full
loaf. We've got to start counting slices.").
110. See Coate, supra note 1.
111. Clare Short, Comment, Depression and Mistrust Prevail at the U.N., THE INDEP.,
Sept. 15, 2005, at 33 (quoting former British Minister Short). See Mary Robinson, A New
Way of Doing the World's Business, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 25, 2005 (stating a
leadership vacuum deprived the summit of "backbone").
112. Robinson, supra note 111.
113. Edith Lederer, Leaders Fall Short of Larger Goals in Effort to Fight Poverty,
Terrorism at the U.N. Summit, Assoc. PRESS, Sept. 17, 2005 (quoting Minister
Rodriguez).
114. Better Than Nothing, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2005, at 54. See March Toward
MDGs Leaving Millions Behind, supra note 108 (quoting Jamaica's Foreign Minister
Knight, speaking for the Group of Seventy Seven; the Summit outcome at best "a bag of
mixed results"); George Mitchell, Op-Ed., Don't Write Off UN. Reform Just Yet, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Oct. 11, 2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/l0/l1/
opinion/edmitchell.php (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (document "papered over many
differences and skirted other issues," but it "establishes a starting point" and a consensus
is building); Nahal Toosi, Annan Defends Summit's Accomplishments, Agrees Some
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American neoconservatives are even more critical. For example,
Brett Schaefer sees the Summit as another step on the path towards U.N.
irrelevance, inefficiency, and more low-priority, costly mandates. 115
John Yoo agrees with this characterization, but goes on to argue that the
U.N. reforms will markedly increase transaction costs, thus reducing the
U.N.'s ability to solve collective action problems. 16  For Nicholas
Kristof, the Summit was history's biggest gathering of "hypocrites," who
"preen and boast"; along with the Italians and Japanese, "Americans set a
dreadful example."'
17
With some justification, much of the blame for reform failures is
attributed to John Bolton, Bush's recess appointment as U.N.
Ambassador. 18 The bull in the china shop that stalemated the Summit
for most observers, Bolton was regarded by the U.S. neoconservatives as
showing that the U.N. emperor had no clothes. At Bolton's request, all
references to the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol
were deleted from the outcome document. But he was unsuccessful at
deleting all quantitative goals relating to the Millennium Development
Initiative. Speaking at the Summit, Bush got to play "good cop" to
Bolton's "bad cop," and the consensus was a pleasant surprise over
Bush's more conciliatory "moral obligation" to go along with much of
the outcome document. 19 Moreover, the poker analogy suggests that
Results Were Nixed, Assoc. PRESS, Oct. 17, 2005 (stating that while the absence of
progress on non-proliferation was a "disgrace," and administrative reforms were mixed,
the MDGs were "endorsed," and the Peacebuilding Commission is a valuable creation).
115. See Brett D. Schaefer, The U.N. Summit Document: At What Cost?, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Sept. 21, 2005 http://www.heritage.org/Research/International
Organizations/wm853.cfn (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
116. See Yoo, supra note 9, at 2.
117. Nicholas D. Kristof, Meet the Fakers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2005, at A31.
118. Even the Republican-dominated Senate refused to confirm Bolton to his
position. Some saw Bush's recess appointment as the abandonment of a bipartisan
foreign policy.
119. See Anger at Washington Simmers on Eve of U.N. Meet, supra note 107; Barbara
Slavin, Bolton Dives Right in to Effort to Change U.N., USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 2005, at
A8; Celia Dugger, UN. vs. Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at A10; Maggie Farley
& Warren Vieth, Bush, Annan Tout Role of the U.N., L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, A13;
Better Than Nothing, supra note 114, at 34. See also Evelyn Leopold, Fears Grow of
Meltdown at Ambitious U.N. Summit, REUTERS, Sept. 11, 2005, http://www.alertnet.org/
thenews/newsdesk/Nl1107587.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (quoting David Schorr)
(Bolton's "overreaching by niggling over small stuff rather than shoring up the major
items"); Jonathan Beale, Strained Relations for U.S. & UN., BBC NEWS, Aug. 8, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4120088.stm (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (informing
that the man Bolton replaced at the U.N., Nicholas Bums, had worked hard and
collaboratively); Klaus Brinkbaumer & Greg Mascolo, The Gangs of New York, SPIEGEL
ONLINE, Sept. 26, 2005 (arguing Bolton downgraded "the final document to little more
than a meaningless sketchpad of world politics."); Thalif Deen, U.S.-U.N. Relations May
be on a Collision Course, I.P.S., Aug. 5, 2005 (stating James Paul Bolton is like an
atheist appointed as ambassador to the Vatican) ("through threats and blackmail," the
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Bolton could not have had so significant an impact on the Summit
without disruptions from the Russians and the minor-player holdouts
that, like the U.S., were grinding very different axes in an attempt to win
short-term games for their own purposes and in distinctiveways.
These reform and non-reform outcomes will be discussed under
eight headings: the composition of, and voting arrangements in, the
Security Council; U.N. powers of intervention and the new
"responsibility to protect" against genocide and war crimes; terrorism, a
central concern of the U.S. and the U.K.; a new Peacebuilding
Commission, to help nations emerging from conflict; the non-
proliferation of W.M.D. as well as ordinary weapons; management and
administration within the U.N.; human rights; and (non-) implementation
of the MDGs. How all of this will be paid for remains to be seen. Of
course, this is a topic of little interest to players totaling up their wins and
losses at poker.
120
A. The Security Council
The Security Council ("S.C.") will remain an unreformed
"aristocratic" (undemocratic) yet rather "toothless executive" body,
which suffers from a "credibility deficit. '' 121 For example, fears of a
Chinese and/or Russian veto have so far stopped the S.C. from a needed
and otherwise-feasible humanitarian intervention in Darfur, Sudan.
Many minor players are opposed to reform of the S.C. because they view
reform as conducive to marginalizing the General Assembly ("G.A.")-
in what is assumed to be a zero-sum poker game between them. More
modest, transaction cost-reducing reforms of the G.A., the minor-
players' bailiwick, were approved by the Summit. These reforms
streamline committee structures, speed up deliberations and rationalize
the G.A. agenda, despite an apparent preference among members of the
G.A. for paralyzing, protracted debates. Poker analyses show why
"democratizing" reforms to the S.C., e.g., eliminating permanent
U.S. tries to bend the U.N. to its will-without breaking it); see also app. infra.
120. Main Divisive Issues Before World U.N. Summit, REUTERS ALERTNET, Sept. 5,
2005. See Julio Godoy, 'Summit Will Look for the Money', I.P.S., Sept. 13, 2005,
http://ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=30243 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (examining
proposals to raise global Tobin taxes on currency speculation, environmentally-hazardous
activities, and corporate profits).
121. See Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 97, at 32 (claiming S.C. has allowed
conflicts to proliferate and intervened arbitrarily); Despite Strictures, UN. Chief Refuses
to Yield, supra note 63, at 19 (stating the S.C. fails to define its own parameters and
responsibilities in, e.g., the Iraq Oil-for-Food program, and is inherently flawed by the
lack of democracy-the vetoes of permanent members are a recipe for paralysis and
failure). But see discussion infra note 321-25 and accompanying text.
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membership and thus veto powers, went nowhere.122
Permanent S.C. members are roughly coextensive with the major
poker players. Although the E.U. gets two S.C. "half'-vetoes since
Britain and/or France do not always reflect interests of the E.U. as a
whole. Denied a S.C. veto, one or more major players could rather easily
find another way to wreck any disagreeable game created by many or
most minor players through the G.A. Indeed, the failure of many
important G.A. 123 resolutions attests to this power. Similarly, creating
additional permanent members, with or without a veto, is bound to fail de
facto because this would increase transaction costs and give mid-level,
quasi-major, players a power they cannot currently win by playing games
with the other majors. In any event, when Annan recommended the
addition of two new permanent members in his In Greater Freedom, the
existing permanent members were unable to choose the new permanents
from among the lobbying aspirants: Japan, India, Germany, Brazil, and
South Africa.
As an alternative, Italy, Canada, Pakistan, Mexico, and sixteen other
countries proposed ten additional temporary, or rotating, S.C. seats. This
is a feasible increase in representation, but it would come at the price of
significantly higher transaction costs in the S.C.'s production of public
goods. In the end, no formal votes were taken on these reforms, and the
Summit's final document contained an anodyne "commitment" to make
the S.C. "more broadly representative, more efficient and transparent."
124
However, the debate over S.C. seats, what some describe as the
Summit's biggest failure to deal with an issue which had been
percolating for a decade, "sucked the oxygen from other issues and
divided the member states. .,12' The rule of international law is widely
122. Even Bush and Bolton were uncharacteristically coy about the S.C. reform,
perhaps because they knew it was doomed to fail. See Evelyn Leopold, Fears Grow of
Meltdown at Ambitious U.N. Summit, REUTERS NEWS, Sept. 11, 2005; Louise G.
Frechette, Deputy Secretary-General, United Nations, Remarks: ABA Day at the UN,
Mar. 29, 2005; Chemimllier-Gendreau, supra note 97, at 32; Making Globalization Work,
supra note 57, at 16; Posner, supra note 9, at 487-88; Darfur's Despair, ECONOMIST, Oct.
15, 2005, at 47.
123. One state, one vote is the rule of the game in the G.A.
124. Richard Black, U.N. Reforms Receive Mixed Response, BBC NEWS, Sept. 17,
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/4255106.stm (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
See Mark Turner, U.N. "Must Never Again be Found Wanting on Genocide ", FINANCIAL
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, http://www.ft.com/home/us (Search for "U.N. 'Must Never Again
be Found Wanting on Genocide"') (last visited Feb. 3, 2008); Evelyn Leopold, Like
Fixing the Weather, Council Reform Eludes U.N., REUTERS ALERTNET, Sept. 19, 2005;
Andrew Teitelbaum, All We Can Hope is That Things Don't Get Worse, 1.P.S., Sept. 24,
2005; Yoo, supra note 9, at 642-43.
125. Chesterman, supra note 84, at 26. See Thalif Deen, U.N. 's Authority Tested by
Perils Ahead, I.P.S., Dec. 27, 2005, http://ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=31590 (last
visited Nov. 3, 2007).
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regarded as endangered and thoroughgoing reforms are arguably needed
so that the S.C. may better defend it. The S.C. must also become more
accountable, transparent and legitimate to counter its image of "the fox
guarding the chicken coop," and adopt more permanent and effective
procedures. 
126
B. Terrorism
A recent study shows "international terrorism" to be the only form
of political violence that is on the increase. 127 Political, organizational
and technological innovations enable terrorist NGOs to do things which
were formerly the province of rogue nation-states-things which render
a national self-defense almost impossible and allow terrorist
organizations to grab a seat at the poker table and often disrupt the game.
For the U.S., Britain, and perhaps some other countries, this justifies an
oxymoronic anticipatory retaliation128 as a game-move. The obvious risk
this tactic poses to peace and security 129 seems to be a prime motive
behind U.N. attempts to regulate terrorism.
A Convention Against Nuclear Terrorism, based on Russian
proposals and criticized for omitting prohibitions on state terrorism, was
approved by the G.A. and opened for signature by leaders at the World
Summit. It is the latest of thirteen anti-terrorism conventions. Still,
some think that terrorism is inadequately outlawed by international law,
especially those who believe that this inadequacy licenses intervention
by one or a few countries. Britain's Tony Blair thus proposed S.C.
Resolution 1624,130 which passed unanimously during the Summit.
Under it, all members must now "prevent incitement" to terrorism, deny
safe haven to terrorists, and (a Blair preoccupation) "counter violent
extremist ideologies."' 3' But Kumi Naidoo, an NGO official and former
126. James Paul & Celine Nahory, Theses Toward a Democratic Reform of the U.N.
Security Council, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, July 13, 2005, http://www.globalpolicy.org/
security/reform/2005/0713theses.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2007). See Juan Somavia, The
Humanitarian Responsibilities of the UN. Security Council, http://globalpolicy.org/
(Search for "The Humanitarian Responsibilities of the U.N. Security Council") (last
visited Feb. 3, 2008); Swiss Government, Working Methods of the Security Council (July
2005), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/2005/06methods.pdf
(last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (relaying seventeen recommendations in a "non paper").
127. See Global Violence Has Decreased, UN. Says, Assoc. PRESS,
http://www.stwr.net/content/view/574/37/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
128. See discussion infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
129. As when misused in Iraqi War II games, for example.
130. S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005).
131. UN. Security Council Passes Resolutions Related to Terrorism, JERUSALEM
POST INT'L, Sept. 14, 2005, (citing S.C. Res. 1624, 1, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept.
14, 2005)). See Andrew Grice, Blair Frustrated as U.N. Fails to Agree on Anti-terror
Action, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 15, 2005, http://news.independent.co.uk.world/
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African National Congress ("ANC") activist, argues that Resolution
1624 is of "no effect" without a definition of "terrorism" from the
Summit G.A. 132 Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First disagree.
Oppressive governments can use vague terms such as "prevent" and
"incitement" to punish non-violent criticisms,1 33 and this author would
add that the obligation to "counter... ideologies" can be used to similar
effect.
The Summit outcome document offered a therapeutic concession to
developed countries, especially the U.S. and Britain, by promising to
"make all efforts" towards yet another convention and condemning
"terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever,
wherever and for whatever purposes."' 134 But, as Naidoo notes, Muslim
nations scotched any definition of "terrorism" which prohibits attacks on
civilians, a definition needed to make the statement in the Summit
document operative, for fear that such a definition would de-legitimate,
politics/article3l2729.ece (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Haider Rizvi, U.N Treaty Targets
Rogue Nukes, I.P.S., Sept. 13, 2005, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=30256 (last
visited Nov. 3, 2007); Yoo, supra note 9, at 642-43; Security Council Meeting at Summit
Level Unanimously Adopts Anti-Terror Steps, Sept. 14, 2005 [hereinafter Security
Council Meeting], http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD= 15800&Cr=
world&Crl=summit (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
132. Black, supra note 124 (quoting Naidoo). The High-Level Panel suggested the
following definition of terrorism: "any action, in addition to... [those in] existing
conventions.... the Geneva Conventions and... [S.C. Res.] 1566, that is intended to
cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants." U.N. Treaty Targets
Rogue Nukes, supra note 131 (quoting the Panel). On the other hand, Annan argued that
"[a]ny action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm
to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or
compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any
act." Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 97 (quoting Annan). Bolton's proposed language
involved "the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians ... when the purpose... is to
intimidate a population or compel a government or international organization [which]
cannot be justified on any grounds ..." Patrick Goodenough, U.N. Summit Document
Won't Define Terrorism, Sept. 14, 2005 (quoting Bolton), http://www.cnnnews.com/
ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=%5CForeignBureaus%5Carchive%5C200509%5CFOR2
0050913a.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2007). No such definition, or any other, was adopted
by the World Summit.
133. See Grice, supra note 131; Mithre Sandrasagra, U.N. Terror Resolution Overly
Vague, HWR Says, I.P.S., Sept. 14, 2005, http://ipsnews.net.news.asp?idnews=30269
(last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Human Rights First, Security Council's Counterterrorism
Resolution Open to Abuse By Authoritarian Governments,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/defenders/hrd.-global/alert092105-res 1 624.htm (last
visited Nov. 3, 2007). For Benin's President, anti-terrorism requires scrupulous respect
for state sovereignty, international human rights, and international humanitarian law. At
the same time, Romania's President maintains that anti-terrorism can be "sustained" only
by S.C. action. See Steven Schifferes, World Bank Discovers Inequality, BBC NEWS,
Sept. 20, 2005. But see Sandrasagra, supra note 133 (quoting the Danish Prime Minister:
"Freedom of speech ... must never be an excuse for inciting terrorism and fostering
hatred").
134. Black, supra note 124.
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e.g., Palestinian self-determination efforts and rights to resist occupation.
Naidoo adds that some thought the ANC a terrorist organization, and it
now governs South Africa. Perhaps unconsciously echoing former
President Reagan's view of the Nicaraguan Contras, Naidoo concludes:
"one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter."135
While China and Russia want the U.N. to help coordinate anti-
terrorism efforts, the Bush Administration 136 wants a carte blanche for
unilateral action, using U.N. coordination only for "fringe" issues like
money laundering. Placing security above development, Bush has
moved further away from multilateral aid, arguably to militarize and
funnel aid to allies such as Pakistan and Israel. These are instances of
regime rather than developmental support-huge "plunger" bets in
pursuit of short-term game payoffs rather than the more profitable, long-
term advanced poker that requires a more equitable, broadly-based
development. At the same time, few believe in the efficacy of the E.U.'s
holier-than-thou rhetoric over development aid either.1 37 Most treat it
like any other bet in a short-term game because it is not backed by
reduction in the E.U. subsidies to European agriculture that leaves most
developing countries without access to European agricultural markets.
C. Intervention
The Summit attempted to breathe new life into multilateral actions,
in what proved to be an imperfect reform in organizational and nation-
state priorities. Perception of collective security threats have changed
with W.M.D., terrorism, humanitarian crises, disaster relief,
discriminatory ideologies, genocide, and abductions 138 becoming more
prominent as threats. Also, complaints are prevalent that multilateral
interventions, as they occur now, are often arbitrary. Complaints further
come to the affect that S.C. consensus resolutions are frequently too
restrictive for a "robust" peacekeeping, and that donor peacekeeping aid
usually arrives too late. Nonetheless, U.N. conflict prevention and
peacebuilding' 39 efforts are becoming more numerous and effective.
Operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone ended more or less
successfully in 2005, and a recent Rand Corporation study found sixty-
six percent of U.N. peacekeeping efforts to be successful. But even if, as
135. Id. (quoting Naidoo). See also U.N. Set Out to Institute Bold Reforms but Ended
Up With Feeble Tweaks, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 15, 2005 [hereinafter U.N. Set].
136. If they want to be honest, China and Russia desire the same ends (by different
means) as the Bush Administration.
137. See Grice, supra note 131; Sanjay Suri, Political Strings Tie Up U.S. Aid, I.P.S.,
Sept. 24, 2005, http://ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=30406 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
138. The abduction of aid workers is of particular concern.
139. See discussion infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
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some argue, the true figure is forty percent, this is an achievement since
collective peacekeeping did not really exist prior to the 1990,s.140
Summiteers sitting as the S.C. passed another Resolution unanimously,
Resolution 1625,141 which is aimed at conflict prevention, especially in
Africa. This Resolution calls for preventative diplomacy, regional
mediation, an early-warning system for potential conflicts, the promotion
of fairness and transparency in elections, and action against the illegal
exploitation of resources such as diamonds. 142 Many also see a need to
break the worldwide Hobbesian cycle of war--conquest, "empire,"
oppression, succession, anarchy, and back to war. This cycle is based on
the incentives and capacities for a violent, collective self-help. Examples
include the ability to coerce would-be "free riders" and to attract an
external support for your cause or to create a unifying distrust of external
opposition. These incentives and capacities can often be altered non-
violently by, e.g., effective recognition of the right to self-
determination. 1
43
Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian General who headed U.N.
peacekeeping in Rwanda, complains that the "Mogadishu rule," in effect
since the U.S. pulled out of Somalia in 1990, governs. "[T]he sense of
responsibility to human beings" loses out "against the self-interested
demands imposed by the governments and.., by their people and
structures." 144 In other words, the initial S.C. decision to play advanced
poker over Rwanda was later deserted by players whose support and
resources the U.N. needed: players who were not altogether free agents
140. Global Violence Has Decreased, U.N. Says, supra note 127. See Chemitlier-
Gendreau, supra note 97; Power, supra note 85; Gordon Brown & Hilary Benn, Let's Put
On Some Institutional Muscle, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 19, 2005 (claiming that in order
to deal with natural disasters, the following must be augmented and better coordinated:
the emergency jurisdiction of the IMF and the WB, the U.N. Office for Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, and the U.N. Emergency Revolution Fund); Howard LaFranchi, A
Welcome Surprise: War Waning Globally, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 18, 2005,
at Al; Haider Rizvi, U.N. Blue Helmets Earn Applause-and Censure, I.P.S., Dec. 30,
2005, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=31623 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Yoo, supra
note 9 (stating humanitarian crises include systematic human rights violations and the
collapse of central authority-or hijacking by non-state actors and involve individual
liability, as well as collective action problems). Yoo arguably proves the reformers' case
when he notes that between the Korean War and Iraqi War I (1991) seventy-five to eighty
percent of deaths from violent conflict came from intrastate conflicts that the U.N.
Charter drafters did not see as threats to peace. See id.
141. S.C. Res. 1625, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1625 (Sept. 14,2005).
142. Security Council Meeting, supra note 131.
143. Globalization, Nationalism, & Human Rights, supra note 8; Paul H. Brietzke,
Self-Determination, or Jurisprudential Confusion: Exacerbating Political Conflict, 14
WIS. INT'L L.J. 69, 77 (1995).
144. Jeff Fleischer, Shake Hands With the Devil: An Interview with Romeo Dallaire,
MOTHER JONES, Jan. 2005, available at http://motherjones.com/news/qa/2005/01/
dallaire.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
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since they operated under "domestic" strictures. These deserting players
thus reverted to short-term, non-peacekeeping poker games where
perceived payoffs were greater. Dallaire contrasts Rwanda with the self-
interested, ostensibly security-based, intervention in Yugoslavia where
people are white-"like us" and living closer to us. He concludes that
conflict resolution requires more enlightened and multi-skilled
peacekeeper/humanitarians who must be given a firm S.C. mandate to
protect the people caught between warring participants.
145
Interventions by another country, rather than the U.N., are
traditionally restricted to self-defense or interventions otherwise
permitted under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. Bush's assertion of a
unilateral right of anticipatory retaliation, especially as misplayed during
his Iraq poker hands, alerted the world community to the need for legal
action. The High-Level Panel thus recommended a five-pronged
interpretive loosening of Chapter 7 strictures, an effort Michael Glennon
labels "wishful thinking., 146 When this proposal is combined with the
inability of the members of the International Criminal Court to define
"aggression," and with polls which show diverse national interpretations
of "peace" and even "development," 147 Glennon concludes that a
"legalist solution" to a profligate use of force is highly improbable. 148
Nonetheless, Annan, and later the World Summit outcome
document, adopted a Canadian initiative: the "responsibility to protect,"
through uninhibited action, civilian populations against genocide or war
crimes when their governments are "unable or unwilling" to do So.
149
145. See id. See Somavia, supra note 126. Humanitarian interventions require "a
series of interlocking legal and logistical safeguards - shored up by the political will of
countries... and operationalized through a coherent U.N. system... functioning with
NGOs and regional and local governments. A separate convention (or treaty) is needed
to protect nongovernmental personnel affiliated with U.N. relief efforts." Id. But see
Anger at Washington Simmers on Eve of U.N. Meet, supra note 107 (stating that since the
1990 failure in Somalia, U.N. peacekeeping operations have become more aggressive and
less "neutral," in Haiti for example, resulting in the death of ninety-one peacekeepers in
2004).
146. Glennon, supra note 21, at 614. Glennon lists the Panel's five "criteria of
legitimacy": 1.) is the threat sufficiently serious, 2.) is the purpose proper, 3.) has every
nonmilitary option been exhausted, 4.) is the military action proportionate to the threat,
and 5.) is there a reasonable chance of success? See id. 614-15. For Yoo, these criteria
will not forestall the use of self-defense as a pretext for illegality. See Yoo, supra note 9.
Bush must have been irked when, during the World Summit, the new Iranian President
called Bush's anticipatory retaliation a "blatant contradiction to the very foundations of
the U.N. and the letter and spirit of its charter." Tyler Marshall, Iran Leader's First UN.
Speech Has a Pretty Clear Target, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005.
147. See discussion infra note 187-211 and accompanying text.
148. See Glennon, supra note 21.
149. See Black, supra note 124. See Iraz Hussain, Is the Glass of U.N. Reforms Half
Full?, DAILY TIMES, Oct. 7, 2005 (stating that between 1827 and 1914, the U.S.
intervened in Latin American countries seventy times on "humanitarian"/"duty to
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This language was adopted despite assertions that it infringes state
sovereignty, fears of endless S.C. debates, and developing countries'
fears that this "responsibility" would give major players, especially the
U.S., an excuse to intervene. The thoughtful former U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights and President of Ireland, Mary
Robinson, praises this World Summit game move, while adding that it is
only the single leg of a stool where the others failed to materialize:
human rights improvements, control over trade in small arms (the real
W.M.D.), and especially, progress over development; the G-8's
"triumphal announcements" came off "looking hollow.'
150
D. Peacebuilding
The post-conflict Peacebuilding Commission is an important World
Summit reform which generated no reported disagreements during
negotiations. Perhaps this is because the Commission formalizes and
institutionalizes steps already being pursued by consensus, sometimes as
logical extensions of more overt inteiventions. The Commission now
creates an in-house expertise and training in mediation and "good
offices." Past efforts show how non-violent interventions by third parties
can bridge deep hatreds to build communication and trust among the
parties. U.N. mediators have helped free hostages, resolve border and
electoral disputes, and forge peace agreements in the Cambodia, El
Salvador, and Guatemala of the 1990's. In particular, Lakhdar Brahimi
navigated deep ethnic and political divisions while creating the "road
protect" grounds; the "principle alone is not sufficient"); Main Divisive Issues Before the
U.N. World Summit, supra note 120.
150. Robinson, supra note 11. See U.N. 'Must Never Again be Found Wanting on
Genocide', supra note 124 (informing that for Zimbabwe's Mugabe, "responsibility to
protect" can be a cynical ploy in an aggressive foreign policy); Rwanda Wants Action,
Not Words, on Genocide Prevention, USA TODAY, Sept. 18, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/ (Search for "Rwanda Wants Action, Not Words, on Genocide
Prevention") (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (quoting Rwanda's Foreign Minister Murigande:
will the document "lead to lengthy academic or legal debates on what constitutes
genocide or crimes against humanity, while people die?"); id. (the U.N. has "consistently
neglected to learn from its mistakes" in, e.g., Rwanda); Brinkbaumer & Mascolo, supra
note 119; Better Than Nothing, supra note 114, at 54. On development and the G8, see
discussion infra notes 200-202 and accompanying text.
The Bush Administration has moved too slowly over Darfur. A no-fly zone has not
been imposed, and there has been no NATO deployment. However, the U.N. is even
slower. Darfur's Despair, supra note 122, at 47; Editorial, Negotiating With Genocide,
WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2005, at B6, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com (select
"Search Archives"; search "1987-Current" for "'Negotiating with Genocide') (last
visited Nov. 3, 2007); Main Divisive Issue Before UN. World Summit, supra note 120.
U.S. Ambassador Bolton (plus China, Algeria, and Russia) thus blocked a U.N. envoy
from briefing the S.C. about human rights violations in Darfur: action, rather than talk, is
required.
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map" for Afghan governance. 15
As an effort which overlaps some U.N. Development Program
("U.N.D.P.") projects, thirty-nine countries 52 have raised forty-two
million dollars to create a new Democracy Fund ("U.N.D.E.F."). The
idea is to fill in the gaps experienced by countries in transit from some
type of authoritarianism. The anticipated projects include: the creation
of civil societies; the rule of law; political parties; independent courts; a
"free press"; trades unions; enhanced monitoring, evaluation, and
auditing capacities; more professionalized civil and military
establishments; and programs to safeguard the rights of women, children,
and minorities. No particular democratic model will be endorsed, no
conditionality will be imposed on the aid given, and the Fund will report
to the G.A. Both of these reforms look like useful ways to restructure
domestic games to make an advanced poker more common and more
likely to yield cooperative, positive-sum outcomes.1
53
E. Non-Proliferation
In contrast to the peacebuilding successes described supra,
Secretary-General Annan noted that the World Summit "could not even
agree on a paragraph on non-proliferation and disarmament, and I...
[find this] a disgrace and a real failure."'1 54  Once again, this kind of
failure may be described as too many players preoccupied with, perhaps
misperceived, short-term gains potentially available from smaller, non-
advanced poker games.155 As things stand, the Nonproliferation Treaty
("NPT") allows the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia to possess
nuclear weapons. But the NPT requires these states to disarm. Other
state-parties are strictly prohibited from having them. India, Pakistan,
and Israel have not signed the NPT, however, and North Korea withdrew
from the NPT in 2002. Nuclear-free countries supported the NPT in the
151. See LaFranchi, supra note 140; Global Violence Has Decreased, U.N. Says,
supra note 127; Editorial, Making Peace Work, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, at M4.
152. Significant contributors include the U.S., India, and Australia.
153. Ayesha Gooneratne, UN. Launches New Democracy Fund, I.P.S., Oct. 12, 2005,
http://ipsnews.net/intema.asp?idnews=30607 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007). See discussion
supra notes 34-61 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra notes 163, 182, 186,
219, 222-34 and accompanying text (discussing the need for an advanced poker). But see
also Middle East Democracy Summit Ends in Rancor, supra note 59. Bush's Forum for
the Future, held in Bahrain, ended without a formal agreement on democracy promotion,
Egypt-thought to be dependent on U.S. foreign aid-insisting on Arab governments'
control over which democracy groups receive aid.
154. Nick Wadhams, General Assembly OKs Compromise Document, Assoc. PRESS,
Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.utexas.edu/conferences/africa/ads/1127.html (last visited
Nov. 3, 2007) (quoting Annan).
155. See e.g., discussion supra notes 34-61 and accompanying test; discussion infra
notes 182, 186, 219, 222-234 and accompanying text.
20071
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
past because of the nuclear "haves" promise to disarm. However, this is
being undermined by Bush's refusal to disarm and other Bush/Bolton
actions, 156 Russia,1 57 and by actions of others. The most dangerous
"other" is Pakistani scientist and black marketeer, A.Q. Khan. Feeling
that Muslim countries had their nuclear weapons desires thwarted while
Israel and India were given free rein, he facilitated a proliferation by
North Korea, a potential proliferation by Iran and Libya, and by who
knows where else. 58 He is such a nationalist hero as to be untouchable
by the international community so long as he stays in Pakistan.
The reformist heavy lifting in this area was helped along by an
NGO. The Nobel Committee awarded the 2005 Peace Prize to the
International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA") and its head, Egyptian
lawyer Mohamed El Baradei. This Prize was both a slap at the U.S.1 59
and a warning that the serious threats posed by Khan, North Korea, Iran,
et al. can only be met through international cooperation rather than
unilateral or collaborative action from within the major players.
Particularly innovative and deserving of global support is El Baradei's
new proposal: countries which do not yet have nuclear weapons should
forbear producing nuclear fuel for at least ten years. Fuel would be
156. Xin Benjian, Who's Pushing Nuclear Proliferation, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE,
Oct. 27, 2005, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200510/27/eng2O051027_217234.html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (stating the forty-four member Nuclear Suppliers Group,
which exerts export controls--especially when the importer has not signed the NPT-
turned down the U.S. request to offer access to India); id. (finding this attempt makes it
more difficult for the U.S. to win support from the international community to not supply
North Korea and Iran); Colum Lynch, Bolton Criticizes Bill Withholding U.N. Funds,
WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2005, at A20 (when asked in Congress why he didn't strike deals
at the Summit for non-proliferation of biological and chemical weapons, Bolton said "We
'tried very hard' but were opposed by countries who saw the U.S. rather than rogue states
as the prime proliferators); Jacques Hymans, Think Again: Nuclear Proliferation,
FOREIGN POLICY, Nov. 2005 (claiming Americans "squander non-proliferation
opportunities through a... tendency to lecture rather than to listen").
157. See, e.g., Ted Turner & Stanley Weiss, Avoiding A Russian Arms Disaster,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2005, at B4 (stating half of Russia's weapons-grade nuclear
materials are poorly protected, as are shells of VX and Sarin nerve gas, and the
Nunn/Lugar program that has eliminated some Russian nukes continues to be under
threat from Congress).
158. Douglas Frantz, From Patriot to Proliferator, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2005. See
Saunders, supra note 82 (in light of the U.N. Charter pledge "to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war," the U.S.'s "failure to agree on disarmament and
nuclear non-proliferation is a woeful foreboding that conflicts will get worse not better").
But see Hymans, supra note 156 (informing that since the end of the Cold War, more
nations have given up nuclear arsenals than have created new ones); id. (claiming the
nonproliferation regime has not been as successful as advertised, since the vast majority
of states simply have no interest in doing what the N.D.T. prohibits).
159. The U.S. had opposed El Baradei's re-election because of his behavior
concerning Iran until it became clear that there was no other suitable candidate. The U.S.
later purported to find in his Nobel Prize a warning to Iran.
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supplied and disposed of by a country already having nukes, with the
IAEA as the supplier/disposer of last resort. The IAEA seems to do its
best work when given unfettered access, 160 which is not the case in North
Korea and Iran, where various nation-state players claim primacy. The
IAEA could be understood as claiming a seat at the poker table, helping
to guide play in more advanced directions.
The World Summit Draft outcome document asked governments to
take action against organized crime, as well as against the proliferation of
small arms16 1 and land mines. 145 nations have ratified the Landmine
[non-proliferation] Treaty, the product of the Campaign that won the
1997 Nobel Peace Prize, and performance under the Treaty has been
relatively good. But regrettably, the Pentagon may soon produce two
higher-tech landmines. 162  To allow Annan the last word, the "non-
proliferation regime" is "unraveling" because "we have allowed
posturing to get in the way of results."1 63 Posturing can be understood as
a relatively insubstantial poker bet, which is treated as such by the other
players.
F. Administration-and a Sidebar
Paul Volcker, the head of the Oil-for-Food Investigating
Commission, which convinced most U.N. members of the urgency of
administrative reform, found that Secretary-General Annan's
"cumulative management performance" fell short of the standard the
U.N. "should strive to maintain."' 164 The putative keeper of the better
natures at the U.N., Annan continued his attempts to rebuild U.N.
legitimacy even at a time when his own political and moral authority was
160. See Despite Strictures, U.N. Chief Refuses to Yield, supra note 63; David Holley,
Nuclear Chief Offers a Nonproliferation Plan: Promise Them Fuel, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2005, at A3; Editorial, Despite Prize, Nuclear Agency Flawed, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 12,
2005, at A22; Nuclear Watchdog Wins Nobel Peace Prize, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 7,
2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/l0/07/europe/web.1007nobel.php
(last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Short-Lived Celebration, supra note 87. But see Hymans,
supra note 156 (claiming while the nonproliferation regime is billed as successful, the
fact is that most countries do not want the bomb in question anyway); id. (the IAEA
regime is "flimsy," suffering from "ambiguous and erratically enforced rules, a myriad of
technical loopholes, and chronic underfunding.").
161. According to Mary Robinson, small arms are "the real W.M.D." Robinson,
supra note 111.
162. Human Rights Watch, Back in Business?: U.S. Landmine Production and
Exports, Aug. 2005 [hereinafter, Back in Business], http://hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/
armsO8O5.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
163. Hussain, supra note 149 (quoting Annan). See Black, supra note 124.
164. Bill Berkowitz, At Sixty, It's Uneasy Times for the U.N., I.P.S., Nov. 10, 2005,
available at http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=30967 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007)
(quoting Volcker).
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at its weakest. Many problems stem from the U.N. bureaucrats' inbred
and cosseted (by diplomatic immunity) existence. Bureaucratic positions
are filled by nationality rather than merit in an atmosphere of secrecy and
unaccountability. This practice leads to the compromise of many U.N.
goals which directly result from a bureaucratic unwillingness or inability
to implement them. With the exception of improved security measures,
to forestall the recurrence of events like the Baghdad explosion that
killed Sergio de Mello and other valued U.N. officials, Annan managed
only partial reforms before the World Summit. These earlier reforms
nonetheless left U.N. bureaucrats, most of whom have little faith in their
seniors, with their morale further damaged. The World Summit thus
approved Annan's additional reforms under his claimed goals of
improving U.N. integrity, impartiality, and its capacity to deliver. These
additional reforms included: an internal ethics office, especially to
resolve conflict-of-interest problems; strengthening the Office of Internal
Oversight Services, and other auditing programs designed to increase
efficiency; a one-time buyout of the least competent U.N. bureaucrats; an
independent and external evaluation committee; and increased
uniformity over which documents are made public, with a bias towards
an increased transparency in the U.N. Secretariat. These were the
reforms the U.S. and other major funders of the U.N. wanted, and they
were adopted despite minor players' suspicions that they would be used
by their advocates, especially the U.S., to control the Secretary-General.
Developing countries' worries were well-placed, as budgetary and other
major administrative controls are being removed from the G.A. where
the developing countries dominate. 165 This looks more like a straight
zero-sum, rather than advanced, poker game, with developed U.N.-
funding countries able to out-bid developing ones.
As mentioned previously, 166 the Oil-for-Food sidebar provoked
shameless exaggeration of the extent of corruption, and of Annan's role
in it, in a failed American neoconservative quest for the Secretary-
General's head. Neoconservatives embarked upon this sidebar because
Annan approved of the S.C.'s denial of permission for Iraqi War II.
165. Brown, supra note 16; Chesterman, supra note 84; U.N. 's Authority Tested by
Perils Ahead, supra note 125; Mitchell, supra note 114; Mark Turner, Envoys Fight to
Keep Annan's Reform Package on Track, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, at 7; Nahal
Toosi, Annan Defends Summit's Accomplishments, Agrees Some Results Mixed, Assoc.
PRESS., Oct. 17, 2005, available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/news/clips/2005/
10/18/annanAP.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Walker, supra note 82; Frechette's U.N.
Challenge, supra note 78; Key Elements of U.N. Draft Document, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2005; Evelyn Leopold, U.S. Fears Summit Will Get U.N. Reform, Rights Plan, REUTERS
ALERT NET, Sept. 12, 2005. See also discussion supra note 19-20; Mark Turner, Volcker
Set to Call for Reform of UN. Leadership, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at 21.
166. See discussion supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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Under this sidebar, Iraq was permitted to circumvent the sanctions
installed after Iraqi War I by selling oil in order to buy food and
medicine. The Reports of the Volcker Commission investigating this
sidebar also encouraged the administrative reforms discussed in the
preceding paragraph. These Reports fault Annan for seeking
administrative review of Oil-for-Food through the S.C., rather than an
outside investigation of the scandal, as well as for failing to supervise his
son Kojo who profited from the corruption and then proved
uncooperative with the Volcker Commission. But U.S., French, British,
Russian, and Chinese representatives on the S.C. oversight committee
approved the relevant Oil-for-Food transfers while turning a blind eye to
abuses. This corruption pales in comparison with that of the U.S.
Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Among other things, twelve
billion dollars was withdrawn from the N.Y. Federal Reserve as 363 tons
of $100 bills. Eighty percent of another large disbursement could not be
accounted for. Fortunately, a neoconservative American attempt to find
corruption in U.N. tsunami funds has gone nowhere.
67
Saddam profited to the extent of $250-600 million per year from
sources including "kickbacks" from Volvo, Siemens, Daimler Chrysler,
Coastal Petroleum of Houston, and 2,400 other firms, as well as from the
sales of oil smuggled through Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. Neither the
kickbacks nor the smuggling was part of the U.N. Oil-for-Food program,
and U.S. and British intelligence had to know of the smuggling and of
the many diplomatic bags stuffed with cash that moved in the opposite
direction because the transactions were impossible to conceal from
overflights and satellites. Nevertheless, Annan accepted responsibility
for these scandals and the attendant design, auditing and management
failures. But having mended his Washington fences with all but the
extremists, Annan then received outspoken support from almost all U.N.
members. How appropriate that differences among countries impeded
supervision and operated to tolerate corruption. What ensued were
"unofficial" poker games among some nation-states, individuals,
especially Saddam, and corporations shamelessly devoted to the making
of money at the expense of dishonoring U.N. ideals and eroding the
public's support for them. No one was in charge (a hallmark of poker)
167. Doreen Carvajal & Andrew Kramer, Report on Oil-for-Food Scheme Gives
Details of Bribes to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A10; Maggie Farley, U.N. Oil-
for-Food Inquiry Findings Surprised Volcker, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A3; Colum
Lynch, Oil-for-Food Probe: UN. Needs Overhaul to Stop Fraud, WASH. POST, Sept. 7,
2005, at A20; Colum Lynch, U.N. Panel Says 2,400 Firms Paid Bribes to Iraq, WASH.
POST, Oct. 28, 2005, at A16; Volcker Set to Call for Reform of UN. Leadership, supra
note 165, at 18-19; Walker, supra note 82; Ian Williams, The Sound of Silence: As in
Dogs Not Barking, MAXIMSNEWS, Dec. 30, 2005, http://www/maximsnews.corn/
2005ianwilliams30december.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
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and no one emerged covered in glory. 16
8
G. Interrelated (?) Human Rights and Development
In a thoughtful article, Philip Alston argues that development and
human rights advocates should pay much more attention to each other's
concerns, which are linked by a "virtual tautology": the "U.N. approach
of indivisibility"'' 69 that arguably informs the entire reform effort.
Human rights and development advocates should "engage more
effectively," share their "imagination and energy," prioritize between
themselves, reduce the gap between rhetoric and actual programs that
both groups share, and work to increase the capacities of "duty-bearers"
to meet obligations, as well as the capacities of "rights-holders" to claim
the fruits of these obligations. 170 Mary Robinson calls extreme poverty
the most serious form of human rights violation, especially given the
ways poor countries use their scarce resources, 17' in no small measure
because of strictures imposed by the IMF, the WB, and private foreign
investors and lenders. Unfortunately, the poker metaphor predicts
Alston's conclusion. Human rights and development advocates are
"ships passing in the night."'172 Different players in different games are
pursuing different gains in different ways, forestalling what is perhaps
Secretary-General Annan's mega-advanced poker of cooperation and
coordination in pursuit of security, as well as human rights and
development.
Human rights may be "open-ended, contingent and...
subjective,"' 173 but they are much less so than the World Summit's
treatment of them. They were potentially improved as an ancillary effect
of establishing the Peacebuilding Commission and of creating the
168. See UN. Panel Says 2,400 Firms Paid Bribes to Iraq, supra note 167; David
Lynch, Report Details Kickbacks for Iraq, USA TODAY, Oct, 27, 2005, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/world/2005-10-27-oil-for-food-x.htm (last visited Nov.
3, 2007); Walker, supra note 82; Probe Finds Illicit, Unethical Corrupt Oil-for-Food
Operation, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 2005, available at http://usatoday.com/news/world/
2005-09-06-oil-for-foodx.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2007). See Volcker Set to Call for
Reform of U.N. Leadership, supra note 165 (quoting Mark Malloch Brown) ("Entrenched
interests inside" the U.N., "wish that all of this would go away and that it could settle
back into comfortable mediocrity again.").
169. Alston, supra note 6, at 784-85. See Security Council Meeting, supra note 131
(quoting French P.M. deVillepin) (calling for "resolute action" at the World Summit "on
everything that fuels terrorism-the inequalities, the persistence of violence, injustices
and conflicts, the lack of understanding among cultures," since force "does not address
the roots of evil").
170. Alston, supra note 6, at 755-56, 770, 790.
171. See id. at 786-87 (quoting Robinson).
172. Id. at 825.
173. Id. at 760.
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"responsibility to protect" against genocide or war crimes. On the other
hand, human rights were seriously damaged by the lack of progress over
non-proliferation and implementation of the MDGs, 174 and slightly
injured by the emphasis on terrorism. Secretary-General Annan called
for reform of the Human Rights Commission into the "third pillar" of the
U.N. because of that Commission's "declining credibility and
professionalism."" 75 The reformed body should operate continuously,
rather than the current six weeks per year term that is conducive only to
grand but superficial gestures; given more time, effective monitoring of
countries' human rights undertakings would be possible. Moreover,
membership in the body should be reserved to countries making real
contributions to human rights. 1
76
In 2004, the Human Rights Commission refused to act over abuses
by China, Iran, Zimbabwe, or Russia in Chechnya. Chaired by Libya,
the 2004 Commission had Zimbabwe as a member and re-elected Sudan
during its Darfur abuses, having earlier refused to re-elect the U.S.
17 7
The U.S. re-election failure attracted the enmity of neoconservatives, and
the apparent top priority of the Bush Administration during the World
Summit was to punish a Commission showing this much
independence... by destroying it.
The Commission repaid this favor by appointing eight independent
human rights experts to aggressively evaluate the rights record of the
U.S. over the past five years as part of the Commission's regular
evaluation cycle. Included within the evaluation is the investigation of
the worldwide treatment of "terrorist" detainees, the U.S.A. PATRIOT
Act and the copycat laws it spawns worldwide, the Iraqi tribunal trying
Saddam and his colleagues, the death penalty, and other shortcomings.
The U.S. has denied admission of the U.N. experts to U.S. prisons in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo. The Mickeljohn Civil Liberties
Institute at Berkeley documented 180 alleged human rights violations by
the U.S. and nineteen alleged violations of human rights duties by the
federal government.
78
174. See app. infra.
175. Human Rights Watch, U.N. Reform Summit Q and A, Aug. 9, 2005 [hereinafter
Q & A], http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/09/08/globall 1704.htm (last visited Nov. 3,
2007) (quoting Annan). See Brown, supra note 16; Security Council Meeting, supra note
131 (quoting deVillepin).
176. See Q & A, supra note 175 (quoting Annan).
177. This reminds me of Lyndon Johnson's response to criticism over appointing
Admiral Hyman Rickover to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: "[Wouldn't you]
rather have him inside the tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in?" CURT
GENTRY, J. EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 558 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1991).
178. Back in Business, supra note 162; Thalif Deen, UN. Human Rights Body to
Scrutinize U.S. Abuses, I.P.S., Sept. 20, 2005, http://www.ipsnews.net/
news.asp?idnews=30355 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007). LaFranchi, supra note 140 (quoting
2007]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
The World Summit missed an important reform opportunity by
referring key decisions about a Human Rights Council, to replace the
Commission, to the G.A. for action. This move was supported by
Russia, China, Egypt, Pakistan, and some other countries concerned
about their human rights record. Only the Summit's doubling of the
budget for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights1 79 is
regarded as adding content to reform, though minimally. It seems clear
that opposition to making human rights protections more effective
among three of the four major players left the matter all-but-unreformed
within the fifth major player. Some criticized the U.S. for trying to
remove countries hostile to U.S. interests from the Commission, and for
its support of some human rights-abusing regimes; however, an E.U.
official called the new Council "a simple name-change."' 80 Trying to put
a brave face on this non-reform, Mark Malloch Brown said that the new
Council offered reform leverage within the G.A. for countries that really
care about human rights. Activists' calls for a human rights court like
that of the E.U. or for a court combining this function with the
International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, are
unlikely to go anywhere for some time to come.' 81
The lack of progress on development during the September 2005
World Summit, and the failure to effectively plan implementation of the
MDGs in particular, is perhaps the clearest illustration this Article offers
of how something like a cooperative/positive-sum advanced poker can
give way under the lure of possibly winning smaller gains more quickly
in ordinary/zero- sum poker ways. At first glance, this is because of the
John Norris of the International Crisis Group; finding recent human rights progress
through "international actions against high-profile violators like Serbia's Slobodan
Milosevic or Liberia's Charles Taylor").
179. The capable Louise Arbour is the current High Commissioner.
180. Evelyn Leopold & Paul Taylor, UN. Assembly Approves Weakened Summit
Blueprint, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com
(quoting Benita Ferrero-Waldner). See Power, supra note 85; U.N. Human Rights Body
to Scrutinize US. Abuses, supra note 178 (quoting Norman Solomon of the D.C. Institute
for Public Accuracy) (the U.S. "is among the most culpable of human rights violators");
id. ("A superpower that is striving to remake" the U.N. "in its own image can hardly be
expected to submit to institutional scrutiny of its actual human rights record."); Hussain,
supra note 149; Evelyn Leopold, US. Fears Summit Will Get U.N. Reform Rights Plan,
REUTERS ALERT NET, Sept. 12, 2005; Anger at Washington Simmers on Eve of U.N. Meet,
supra note 107; Envoys Fight to Keep UN Reform Package on Track, supra note 165.
181. Brown, supra note 16; Human Rights Watch, Key Human Rights Proposals
Stymied, Sept. 13, 2005, http://hrw.org/English/docs/2005/09/13/global11735.htm (last
visited Nov. 3, 2007).
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limited altruism displayed by most developed countries; Canada,
Holland, and the Scandinavian countries are worthy exceptions. This
altruism is mostly exhausted on the plight of fellov'-citizens, rather than
on far-away "strangers," unless the foreigners are victimized by some
mediagenic disaster perhaps. Also, middle-income countries like India
and Brazil can expect little in the way of increased development aid and
are, rather, worried about tougher human rights standards and a dilution
of their influence at the U.N. International law thus continues to honor
voluntary redistributions by aid "donors," perhaps through what are
called MDG "development compacts," but almost never creates a legal
obligation of redistribution. 182 Such an obligation could be imposed as a
matter of developed country status rather than contract, but it would be
almost impossible to enforce this obligation under governance without a
government, or to determine the relative rights and obligations of
middle-income countries.
Unfortunately, this international law and practice of a voluntary and
thus limited altruism is badly out of step with a well-informed reality.
While development is a "public good"-initially, a perception which
182. Alston, supra note 6, at 777, 786, 825; Posner, supra note 9; Envoys Fight to
Keep U.N. Reform Package on Track, supra note 165. For example, an eighty-eight
million dollar U.N. appeal concerning starvation caused by drought in Malawi,
contemporaneous with the World Summit, attracted no government pledges after three
weeks, where one dollar per day would save a life. See Malawi Appeal Gets 'Not a
Penny', BBC NEWS, Sept. 9, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4228854.stin (last
visited Nov. 3, 2007).
Similarly, the 2005 aid shortfall at the U.N. High Commission for Refugees and the
U.N. World Food Program ("WFP") is $219 million and $182 million respectively. See
U.N. Appeals for Greater Food Aid for Refugees, Assoc. PRESS, Sept. 14, 2005, available
at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9339348 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
Developed countries spend more in a week to subsidize their own farmers than they
spend in a year to help starving children. See U.N. Warns of Rising Hunger Deaths, BBC
News, Oct. 16, 2005, http://search.bbc.co.uk/cgi-bin/search/results.pl?scope=all&
edition=i&q=UN+wams+of+rising+hunger (last visited Nov. 3, 2007). The WFP
requested bids from the ten largest reinsurance companies in a pilot scheme to insure
Ethiopia against drought. See Mark Turner, U.N. Move to Insure Against Drought,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 15, 2005 (claiming such insurance is necessary only because of
limited altruism, since a global self-insurance by all of us would save much money in
terms of reinsurance company profits). In contrast, a proposed insurance fund for foreign
investors in Gaza makes sense regardless of altruism since this kind of private-sector
insurance is commonly thought essential to investment in developing countries and
commonly arranged through a division of the WB. See What That Accord Really Says,
supra note 32. But see Linus Atarah, World Bank Chief Says Africa is First Priority,
I.P.S., Oct. 24, 2005, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.aspidnews=30742 (last visited Nov.
3, 2007) (quoting Wolfowitz) (discussing developed countries "obligation" to help
developing countries without describing how the obligation can be enforced); id.
("uncomfortable" for developing countries to give up subsidies during Doha negotiations,
but this is far less serious than the "daily... deprivation" these subsidies generate among
"the poorest").
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encourages many developed countries to be "free riders" who reap
diffuse benefits without bearing focused costs183 -development also
spawns significant benefits which can be directly appropriated by
individuals, NGOs, and developing as well as developed countries in the
long run. Development of course results in more goods and services
being produced, traded, and consumed. But development also results in
a more tolerant citizenry, a willingness to settle disputes peacefully, a
democratic inclination, and the greater energy and happiness that flow
from improving living standards. After all, this is the promise of
modernism, which is why post-modernism is unpopular in the Third
World. People there want to experience extensive material benefits
before feeling "alienated" from them. In contrast to the benefits of
development, economic stagnation or decline is conducive to frustration,
friction and, sometimes, ethnic strife, authoritarianism and a swelling of
terrorist ranks.
From this perspective, two central developmental problems remain.
Western politics has an overwhelmingly short-term orientation which is
ill-suited to development issues, an orientation marked by two- and four-
year election cycles in the U.S. Additionally, large gaps in the agendas
and priorities among countries result in a shortage of the cooperation
essential to sustaining advanced poker. 184  Such gaps spawned what
South Africa's Mbeki termed a "half-hearted, timid, and tepid" World
Summit, 185 paralysis and apparent deadlock, as of this writing, in the
"suspended" Doha Round of WTO negotiations, and widespread
dissatisfaction with the (anti-) developmental behavior of the IMF and
the WB. The remedy proposed infra is a reinvigoration of the rules of
liberal internationalism to further embed a global advanced poker
through a mature understanding of our long-term interests and needs.1
86
The MDGs 18 7 were to be the focus of the September 2005 World
Summit, accounting as they did for half of the Summit draft (pre-
negotiations) outcome document. Secretary-General Annan observed
183. At the World Summit, the Presidents of China and Indonesia stressed the
importance of a global cooperation, without which development efforts are bound to fail.
See U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., 3d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. GA/10381 (Sept. 14, 2005)
(insisting cooperation with people otherwise excluded from the development process is
particularly important to success). See discussion supra note 11 and accompanying text.
184. See generally BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH (Knopf 2005); Why the Rich Must Get Richer, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12,
2005, at 87.
185. Paul Fray, 'A Miserable Performance, "Mbeki Scolds U.N. Performance, I.P.S.,
Sept. 16, 2005, http://ipsnwes.net.news.asp?idnews=30307 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007)
(discussing the lack of resources for the poor to extricate themselves from misery and the
related need for developed countries to go beyond traditional definitions of "security").
186. See discussion infra notes 221-34 and accompanying text
187. See app. infra.
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that "[n]ations must tear down the walls that separated the developed and
developing world,"'' 88 and Roger Coate speaks of a "system-wide
initiative to raise people out of hell-like conditions."'1 89 Hellen Tombo
and Kevin Watkins discuss the reality of a global inequality: 2.5 billion
people currently live on less than two dollars per day, with 1.2 billion of
these living at a lower "poverty" level.1 90 In 2015, the anticipated end of
the MDG process, projections indicate that 800 million will still live in
poverty, 380 million more than the relevant MDG Target stipulates. In
2005, we are five years into the twenty-year MDG process, and fifty
countries (900 million people) have made little or no progress toward
one or more MDG targets. This lag also undermines progress in meeting
the other targets. The projected non-attainment of another Target by
2015 means that an additional forty-one million children will die
needlessly. A child currently dies every three seconds, a mother dies
every minute during childbirth, and 25,000 people die from starvation
every day. More than one billion people lack access to a safe water
supply, and 2.6 billion lack access to sanitation. Yet, rich countries give
half as much development aid, in real terms, as they gave in 1960.191
A significant departure from previous approaches to development,
the MDGs captured the imagination and energy of international agencies,
developing countries, and NGOs. Mobilization of these organizations is
sought to generate national reports that describe development priorities
1 92
and voluntary "development compacts" between a developing country
and developed countries. Transparency and a great deal of publicity are
thought essential to keeping the countries' and organizations' feet to the
developmental fire, but coverage of the MDG process by mainstream
media has been disappointing so far.
193
Conflicts over development priorities and techniques emerged soon
188. U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., 2d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. GA/10379 (quoting Annan).
189. Coate, supra note 1.
190. See March Toward MDGs Leaving Millions Behind, supra note 108 (referencing
Hellen Tombo of the Global Call to Action Against Poverty); Isaac Baker, Time for a
"Decisive Breakthrough, UN Urges, I.P.S., Sept. 7, 2005, http://www.ipsnews.net/
news.asp?idnews=30168 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); United Nations Development
Programme Bulletin, More Aid, Pro-Poor Trade Reform, and Long-Term Peace-Building
Vital to Ending Extreme Poverty, Sept. 7, 2005, at E-l-i, available at
http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/HDR-07092005.en;jsessionid=axbWzt8vXD9?
gI ln.enc=ISO-8859-1 (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (quoting Kevin Watkins, a lead author
of the 2005 UNDP Human Development Report).
191. See March Toward MDGs Leaving Millions Behind, supra note 108; Baker,
supra note 190.
192. Many of the reports already drafted make no reference to human rights.
193. See Alston, supra note 6, at 756, 777, 780, 786; Diana Cariboni, Poverty Missing
From the News Agenda, I.P.S., Nov. 22, 2005, http://ipsnews.net/
news.asp?idnews=31125 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
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after the consensus, advanced poker, promulgation of the MDGs in 2000.
A few countries, led by the U.S., continue to advocate the "free-market
model" of "development"' 94 that reigned in the 1990's after the demise
of many communist party-states and the erosion of the means to finance
"welfare" measures in social democracies. 195  In contrast, many
developed and almost all developing countries pursue goals which are
ignored de facto by markets and their advocates: rather modestly
redressing inequalities in favor of the poor and powerless, and
forestalling the economic instabilities characteristic of an unregulated
capitalism, particularly the "premature" marketization that the IMF and
the WB demand from developing countries. 196 The U.S. thus winds up
pursuing free trade at the expense of generous development aid (aid
supplied subject to conditions which make the relatively small sums less
effective), while the E.U. supports relatively generous aid at the expense
of a potentially more valuable free trade, especially in agriculture.
Russia and China, the other major players, passively support the
developmental strategy of the majority, while the WB now speaks of an
oxymoronic "market-driven equality."'
' 97
194. The term "development" in reality means the pursuit of economic growth.
195. Family planning was deleted from the MDGs prior to their promulgation to
appease American neoconservatives and the Vatican, despite the essential role of
population control in attaining MDG targets among the least developed countries.
196. See discussion supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text; see discussion infra
note 197 and accompanying text.
197. See Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 97; Shirin, World Bank Calls for Market-
Driven Equality, I.P.S., Sept. 20, 2005; Marcela Valente, Civil Society Forum-A Sham?,
I.P.S., Sept. 9, 2005, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=30209 (last visited Nov.
3, 2007); Thalif Deen, Family Planning Subtracted from MDG Equation, I.P.S., Sept. 13
2005. There is too little development aid. Adjusted for inflation, it has not increased yet.
African countries are dependent on it. Agriculture has been neglected recently, as too
much aid is absorbed by consultants from the donor country, and effectiveness is reduced
by the overlaps created by a failure to coordinate donors' programs. See Dugger, supra
note 119; SACHS, supra note 94, at 7; Editorial, The Foreign Aid Gap, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2005, available at http://www.thedailyjoumalonline.com/article.asp?Categoryld=
13303&Articleld=197052 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007). Even the U.S. HIV/AIDS program
is bilateral and channels funds according to U.S. strategic interests.
Free trade maximizes output from given inputs, but says nothing about the
distribution of that output. See Stephen King, Free Trade is Not Perfect but It's All
We've Got, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 12, 2005, available at
http://news.independent.co.uk/business/comment/article311 968.ece (last visited Nov. 3,
2007). According to the WB's Wolfowitz, "inequity" most often happens when markets
are missing, imperfect or failing. But the MDGs are driven by the idea that lack of
development does not flow from a lack of trade, but rather from a lack of capital and
geographic, political or technological constraints. See id. According to Social Watch,
the resulting poverty stems from an inequality of access to income, power, job
opportunities, information, social services, and political participation. This amounts to
Amartya Sen's deprivation of basic capabilities, measurable under the Social Watch
Index: the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel, the under-five infant
mortality rate (which grows worse in fifty-six countries), and the proportion of children
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The World Summit MDG outcome was spotty with an overall lack
of progress in solving the collective action problems of development.
Optimists' hopes that the MDG process would rejuvenate multilateral
behavior were thus dashed. 198 Mary Robinson concludes that the MDGs
"now seem set to join the pile of broken pledges that mark the old U.N.'s
in school through the fifth grade. See Cariboni, supra note 190. Martin Ravallian,
Inequality Is Bad for the Poor, (World Bank Research Paper), available at
http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/wir2006/ravallion.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
Economic growth and trade are distribution-neutral, often inequality-promoting, and
thus they have less of the "welfare impact" associated with development. Care must be
used in displacing poverty reduction (rather than inequalities reduction as such)
programs, lest redistributive policies inhibit growth and create additional economic
distortions. "Win-win policies" are the solution, policies that eliminate inhibitions on
growth, which also serve to increase inequalities. Examples are, fixing market and
government failures, making institutions work better, improved infrastructures, and a
better delivery of quality health and education which is more responsive to the needs of
the poor. See id. Inequality is the root cause of poverty in Latin America. The halving
of extreme poverty (MDG Target 1) by 2015 is unlikely in Brazil or Argentina, and
attention to poverty occurs only through the election of progressive governments. See id.
See also Shirin, supra note 197 (quoting Rick Rowden) (claiming equality cannot come
about through market-based privatization policies or without eliminating a gender-bias);
Marwaan Macon-Maskor, Corruption, Worst Hurdle in Asia-Pacific, I.P.S., Sept. 23,
2005, at 1 (citing a recent ILO study about the growing "employment gap," "jobless
growth" in booming Asian economies that increasingly underfund public heath); Anja
Tranovich, Will World Leaders Face the "Pink Collar" Underclass, I.P.S., Sept. 1, 2005,
http://ipsnews.net/africalprint.asp?idnews=30109 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (stating
women are more likely to work in the "informal" sector, in the most precarious jobs with
the lowest wages). A term growing in popularity is "equity": a move towards equality. It
amounts to "empty rhetoric conserving a regressive status quo," without changes in
institutions which allocate resources and economic opportunities. Equity Promotes
Efficiency: A Radical Insight From the World Bank-The Economic Times, TIMES NEWS
NETWORK, Sept. 28, 2005, available at http://amicorcvd.blogspot.com/2005/09/equity-
promotes-efficiency-radical.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
198. Paul Martin and Soraka Lyer of the Third World Network argue that the World
Summit shows that world leaders are "isolated from.., global poverty" and "appear...
immune" to "mass mobilizations." March Toward MDGs Leaving Millions Behind,
supra note 108. Salil Shetty, the Director of the U.N.'s Millennium Campaign, fears that
the 2015 MDG targets will not be met as a whole, "not even in 100 years." World Must
Act to Alleviate Crippling Debt and Rampant Poverty, Leaders Tell U.N. Summit, U.N.
NEWS CENTRE, Sept. 15, 2005, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/
story.asp?NewsID=15832&Cr=world&Crl=summit (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (stating
progress on meeting Target 1, halving poverty, is relatively good but "masks huge
disparities across and within countries and regions," and the low or inappropriate quality
of aid). This admitted progress on Target 1 is actually small in comparison with the
global availability of human, financial, and technical resources. See Baker, supra note
190; Hussain, supra note 149. Thus, the original purpose of the Summit subordinated to
political and security interests. However, the Summit "clearly created stronger support"
for developed countries contributing 0.7% of their GNP for development aid, created
innovative means of financing, for example, a small tax on airline tickets. The World
Summit outcome document did declare that gender equality, HIV/AIDS, and
reproductive health must be kept at the top of the global agenda. The Summit also set up
an International Financing Facility, to make development aid more predictable and
accessible.
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history."' 99 The Summit also ratified an earlier move by the wealthy G8
countries, which then received additional ratifications from IMF and WB
meetings. After eight years of popular campaigning through rock
concerts, etc., the G8 agreed to provide forty to fifty-five billion dollars
in debt relief for the twenty poorest countries. This number would go as
high as thirty-eight countries, but Kenya for example is deemed to have a
"sustainable" debt burden. The G8 action can be regarded as a follow-up
on previous advanced poker rounds of winning partial debt forgiveness
for the poorest countries, even though such steps violate the IMF's
"uniformity of treatment" rule. Nothing was done about the fair amount
of this debt that was used corruptly to finance elite lifestyles in the
poorest countries, or about the economists' "moral hazard" for the future:
having past debts forgiven, elites are likely to create new debt and use it
inappropriately in the expectation that the new debt will be forgiven as
well. 200  Instead of simply forgiving it, the debt could have been
converted into supervised programs to finance the pursuit of MDG
targets. G8 countries will likely deduct this debt relief from the
development aid they otherwise intend to give. A mere one month after
the Summit, at a WB meeting, the G8 fell to quarreling, reverted to an
ordinary, zero-sum poker, over who pays what, who is eligible for relief,
and which conditions will be attached. Belgium, Holland, and Norway
fear that the costs of this debt abatement will not be fully funded by the
G8, leaving the IMF and the WB with too little income to function.201 In
other words, these international organizations "swapped the risk that
poor countries will not repay their loans for the risk that rich countries
will not redeem their promises. 20 2
Many in the Third World would find a mixed blessing in the IMF
and the WB having too little income to function. Developing countries
see their under-representation in these international agencies as
diminishing agency significance, and as fueling the need to circumvent
them. For example, the G8 are assumed to be more sympathetic, even
though developing countries have no formal representation there. Strict
IMF and WB policies are seen to curb development and democracy.
Politicians and bureaucrats must respond to these organizations'
strictures, rather than to local electorates. An NGO study shows that of
199. Robinson, supra note 111.
200. See Posner, supra note 9; Bad Loans Made Good, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 2005, at
70. The G8 countries are Russia, Britain, France, Germany, the U.S., Japan, Italy and
Canada. Philip Thornton, Rich Nations Finally Give Go-Ahead to Long-Awaited
Agreement on Debt Relief THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 27, 2005, available at
http://news.independent.co.uk/business/news/article315145.ece (last visited Nov. 3,
2007).
201. See Bad Loans Made Good, supra note 200; Atarah, supra note 182.
202. Bad Loans Made Good, supra note 200, at 70.
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the 308 IMF and WB policies imposed on fifty countries, only eleven
policies diverged from the "Washington [Reaganite, neoclassical
economics] consensus" of strict monetary and fiscal policies,
deregulation and privatization, and the premature opening to an
international competition of capital, financial, labor, and product markets
in developing countries.2 °3
Large WB projects in developing countries are bonanzas for
multinational corporations and corrupt local politicians, but they do little
for the poor other than evict them from subsistence lands. More than
seventy percent of WB loans go to as few as twelve middle-income
countries: countries that are able to meet their capital needs through
private markets. This pattern continued with WB President Wolfowitz
recently touting a mega-project to supply electricity to Congo, Malawi,
Zimbabwe, and South Africa. This project looms on the horizon despite
the consensus that small projects better meet the needs of the poor,
especially in water and energy, and especially if the projects are made
accountable to their ostensible beneficiaries. Like his predecessor,
Wolfowitz paid lip-service to such projects and virtues. A Dutch M.P.
notes that parliamentarians must inform themselves and apply extra
pressure to countries and the WB so as to keep their games honest.
The story is much the same for the IMF. Asian countries have
accumulated huge foreign exchange reserves, in part so they do not have
to go begging to the IMF. Argentina defaulted and otherwise took a hard
line against the IMF and private creditors, yet this resulted in only a
three-month depression. Argentina amounted to a huge loss of IMF
influence, a bluff well and truly called on the cut-down-to-size IMF
leader of a "creditors' cartel" of other multilateral creditors, rich
countries, and the private sector. The Group of Twenty ("G20") rich and
developing countries describe the need for the IMF to improve
governance, strategy, and operations and to reform their quotas which
govern particular countries' capacity to borrow. The IMF seems to
understand the need to increase its legitimacy through such reforms,
expand developing country influence in the IMF, introduce transparency,
and forbear from attaching stability and development endangering
conditions to IMF loans.2° Only the future will tell.
The legally guaranteed separatism of the IMF and the WB, which
are accountable pro rata to the countries providing loan funds, and of the
World Trade Organization ("WTO"), accountable to its 150 members,
203. Shirin, World BankIIMF Losing Relevancy, South Says, I.P.S., Sept. 23, 2005,
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=30398 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007); Sanjay Suri,
Straight Talk Expected at Post-Helsinki Roundtables, I.P.S., Sept. 12, 2005,
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=30224 (last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
204. See Atarah, supra note 182.
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means that global development policies are not integrated or coordinated
by the Secretary-General, the World Summit, or anyone else. The now
suspended Doha Round of the WTO negotiations20 5 has regularly been
on the brink of collapse since 2003, with too much finger-pointing
(insignificant bets, perceived as such) and too little leadership, as the
poker metaphor leads us to expect. Doha is the first real chance for
developing countries to engage in trade negotiations that might enhance
their economic growth, reduce their poverty,2 °6 and perhaps curb some of
the market fundamentalisms of the previous Uruguay Round.
Three main "games" were played simultaneously in Doha, some at
the final table, and some at side tables: (1) liberalizing farm trade, the
most distorted of global trade sectors; (2) liberalizing trade in services,
chiefly in the banking, medical, and accounting sub-sectors; and
(3) decreasing industrial tariffs, measures which the E.U. in particular is
keen for developing countries to implement. These seem to be negative-
sum poker games: meager winnings by developed countries do not seem
to wash their losses, while developing countries saw their betting
resources dissipated.
The clearest example of ordinary poker occurs in negotiations over
liberalizing trade in services. These negotiations have led to
decentralized results, with different countries betting on different deals in
what amounts to separate games. A total collapse rather than suspension
of the Doha Round would also result in fragmentation with rich countries
able to pick off poor ones one-by-one by "betting" more than poor
countries can afford to "call" while creating bilateral trade treaties.
Advanced poker is structured to avoid such a collapse and thereby keep
all the players at the table within the broader Doha "game" geared
toward fairer and more broadly acceptable rules, rather than a simple
Uruguay Round rush to further liberalizations. However, for the
advanced poker game to succeed, the poorer countries must find their
way back into the game. The apparent Doha deadline is mid-2007, when
President Bush's "fast track" authority ends. The Senate must determine
whether to ratify the Doha agreement until mid-2007, without
introducing protectionist amendments that favor particular
constituents.207
205. The Doha Round of the WTO negotiations was lodged in quasi-authoritarian
Qatar to minimize anti-WTO demonstrations.
206. See The Farmer's Friend, ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 2005, at 58; In the Rough,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 2005, at 77.
207. See Chakravarthi Ragavan, If WTO Negotiations Fail, It Will Not Necessarily Be
a Disaster, I.P.S., Sept. 24, 2005; In The Rough, supra note 206; The Trade Game, supra
note 15 (using two party, one issue game). The WB estimates the (scaled-back) benefit
of a successful Doha Round to developing countries at twenty to thirty billion dollars per
year. But see Channing Arndt, The Doha Trade Round and Mozambique (World Bank
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Middle-income countries like Brazil and India refuse to budge on
services, and especially on industrial tariffs, the second and third Doha
poker games respectively, where they want to protect fragile local
industries, absent significant progress on the first Doha poker game, their
access to the agricultural markets of developed countries. Annual farm
subsidies amount to nineteen billion dollars in the U.S. and seventy-five
billion dollars in the E.U. Protectionist Japan hides behind these major
players. The farm subsidies are locally-popular barriers, which are
difficult for poor, developing, and even middle-income countries to leap
over. The U.S. bets significant farm subsidy reductions in an ostensible
attempt to break the Doha gaming deadlock, but the E.U., and especially
France, refuses to match (or "call") the U.S.'s bet. The U.S. can thus be
said to have "called" the E.U.'s "bluff' over development being a "core"
value within E.U. foreign policy. However, it is widely known that
Congress is unlikely to underwrite the U.S. Trade Representative's bet.
The 2007 Farm Bill shows that all pretense of reducing subsidies has
been abandoned. It is even reported that the thirty-two poorest WTO
members have had trouble agreeing on a common Doha position, despite
their not being required to make concessions during negotiations.2 °8
At the December 2005 Hong Kong Summit, expectations were low
that participants could create a meaningful framework agreement for the
Doha Round. Philip Bowring gave this Summit a low but not failing
grade for achievement because it showed developing countries to be
more dedicated trade liberalizers than their developed counterparts.
20 9
NGOs like Oxfam and Greenpeace were very critical. The behavior of
Policy Research Working Paper 3717, 2005), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/09/15/000016406_20050
915100216/Rendered/PDF/wps3717.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (informing that one
study shows projected benefits and adjustment costs to be relatively small in
Mozambique); Joachim Filo & Mark Horridge, The Doha Round, Poverty and Regional
Inequality in Brazil (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3701, 2005), available
at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/08/30/
000016406_20050830162719/Rendered/PDF/wps3701.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (a
successful Doha's "positive but rather small" effects on the structure of poverty and
income distribution in Brazil).
208. See Alan Beattie et al., EU Under Fire as Trade Talks are Halted, Financial
Times, Oct. 20, 2005; Stefania Bianchi, EU Under Fire Over Doha, I.P.S., Oct. 20, 2005;
Editorial, French Monkey Business, Wash. Post, Nov. 3, 2005, at A20; The Trade Game,
supra note 15, at B10. The existing WTO Agreement on Agriculture has Special
safeguards provisions (special import restrictions for certain types of "emergencies")
which developing countries would like to prohibit developed countries from using.
209. See Philip Bowring, Silver Lining in WTO Talks, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 19,
2005, at 9. See also Don Lee, Delegates Eke Out a Trade Deal, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19,
2005, at Cl (suggesting that a Hong Kong failure would have damaged WTO credibility
while it contends with the proliferation of bilateral trade agreements, growing global
economic imbalances, and growing protectionist sentiment in developed countries).
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demonstrators, mostly South Korean farmers, was mirrored inside the
hall by E.U. representatives. 110 developing countries united in a
historic first for the WTO in an effort to make the Round the
development round it was supposed to be. Their efforts failed, however,
because developed countries gained no meaningful access to the
agricultural markets of developing countries. Developed countries
agreed to eliminate agricultural export subsidies by 2013, but export
subsidies are a small fraction of the total U.S. and E.U. farm subsidies.
The agreement would eliminate quotas and tariffs for the fifty least
developed countries in 2008, but the U.S. has already said that it will
likely exempt textiles and apparel from this abolition.21 °
To provide counterpoint to this Doha/Hong Kong quasi-anarchy,
and to round out the picture of multilateral development efforts, the
World Summit also called for the reform of the Economic and Social
Council ("ECOSOC"). The Summit also implemented the Hyogo
Framework to reduce disaster relief response times, improve disaster
prevention measures and early warning systems, and secure more food
supplies for disasters which are less tied to donors' conditions. The
global response to the South Pacific tsunami seemed adequate, with the
U.N. playing an important, but far from exclusive role because the U.S.,
Australia, and a few others doubted U.N. efficiency. But hurricanes in
Central and South America, famine in Niger, and the earthquake in
Kashmir illustrate donor inattention and "fatigue," as well as a shortage
of U.N. resources. Such disasters will negate development efforts in
affected countries for many years to come unless creative programs and a
great deal of money are forthcoming. The new High-Level Commission
for the Legal Empowerment of the Poor, apparently not considered by
the World Summit, has Hernando de Soto and Madeline Albright as co-
Commissioners. It is likely not to be a mere substitute for taking action
because de Soto's legally-defined property rights "movement" is
increasingly accepted as the best means of transition from an informal
economy into a measure of entrepreneurship. There is currently $9.3
trillion worth of unregistered land and equipment worldwide, which can
be levered into additional wealth, security for loans, etc., through
registration and the other means that the Commission will consider.21" '
210. See Gustavo Capdevila, Service Sector Is Next Battle in Trade War, I.P.S., Dec.
30, 2005, http://www.redorbit.com/news/science/347149/challenges_20052006_service_
sector is next battle in tradewar/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2007); Lee, supra note 209, at
Cl; Ramesh Jaura, New 110-Nation Pact Pushes Development as Trade Priority, I.P.S.,
Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.redorbit.com/news/intemational/332530/wtonew_
1 Onationpact-pushes..development asjtrade priority/index.html (last visited Nov. 12,
2007) (indicating the fifty least developed countries, thirty-four of which are in Africa,
hold 12.5% of world population but account for only 0.5% of world trade).
211. See Alejandro Chaufen, UN. Discovers Property Rights, Wash. Times, Nov. 2,
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H. The Games Continue
In the wake of the World Summit, the new G.A. President, Eliasson
of Sweden, said members were busy mapping negotiating positions: in
effect, structuring new poker games. Members were also busy dealing
with matters that take precedence, such as setting up the Peacebuilding
Commission and the Human Rights Council that had to be in place by
the end of 2005. Members also busied themselves with the drafting of a
terrorism convention to be finished by the end of the G.A. session in
September 2006. The crucial definition of "terrorism" continues to be
contentious. Some members, such as Palestine, continue their efforts to
protect the rights of self-determination and of resisting occupation that
some opponents see as "terrorism." In late November, a speech by U.S.
Ambassador Bolton gave the U.N. "its usual warning" from the U.S.:
"Do what we say or we will send you into oblivion. 21 2  Annan
commented: "I am not the interpreter of Ambassador Bolton," and an
American reader of the Bolton-ian tea leaves sees the U.S. continuing to
seek "multilateral cover for unilateral and illegal U.S.
interventions.... 213  As 2005 drew to a close, the U.N. could not
approve its 2006-07 budget because of the implicit U.S. threat to
withhold funds if members did not enact the "radical" reforms the U.S.
sought, especially in administration. Abandoned at the last moment, this
threat showed that the U.S. was rather disengaged from the September
World Summit that created so much "fudge and mush." Jeffrey Laurenti
attributes this stance to Bush's "foreign policy schizophrenia," also
termed his "bipolar" isolationism. 214  The Group of Seventy-Seven
2005. The U.N.'s emergency relief coordinator, Jan Egeland, proposes additional
reforms: a central fund, to which the U.S. will not contribute, and other ways to leave
relief less "overstretched." Imogen Foulkes, U.N. Urges Disaster Response Reform,
BBC NEWS, Nov. 23, 2005.
212. ThalifDeen, U.S. Ambassador Ups the Ante for Control of the U.N., I.P.S., Nov.
23, 2005 (quoting Global Policy Forum's Jim Paul, who paraphrases Bolton).
213. Id. (quoting Annan and Institute for Policy Studies' Phyllis Bennis respectively).
See General Assembly President Outlines Progress on U.N. World Summit Issues, U.N.
NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 17, 2005, available at http;//www.un.org/news (follow advanced
search link, enter date parameters as after Nov. 16, 2005 and before Nov. 18, 2005, and
search term "World Summit Issues") (last visited Nov. 3, 2007) (quoting and citing
Eliasson). The U.S. seeks to dis-empower the G.A. and make Annan's successors
accountable to Washington as "glorified CEOs." See Thalif Deen, U.N. Faces New
Political Threats From the U.S., I.P.S., Nov. 23, 2005, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?
idnews=31152 (last visited Nov. 12, 2007). Many of the Secretary-General's top staff
has been replaced by active supporters of the U.S.'s agenda, but Annan has nevertheless
retained some independence. See id. The net effect is more belligerent, but otherwise not
very different from, Clinton's "assertive multilateralism," where Madeline Albright
famously called the U.N. "a tool of American foreign policy." Id.
214. Jeffrey Laurenti, Schizophrenic Administration Heightens U.S. Isolation, THE
CENTURY FOUND., Dec. 21, 2005, http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC&pubid=l 172 (last
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("G77"), discussed infra, refused to rush into decision under threats from
U.S. neoconservatives, taking the position that later reforms can be paid
for under supplementary budgets. This led Bolton, that comfortable
contrarian who reportedly "speak[s] power to truth,"215 to propose a
three-month budget, indicating that the U.S. could and would solve
global problems by turning to mechanisms other than the U.N.'s. The
U.N. unanimously approved a two-year budget in late December with a
spending cap, backed by the U.S., the E.U., and Japan, that expires in six
months. Annan interpreted this as those reforns passed by the
September World Summit, and the cap petered out.
216
From the other side, the 132-member G77 developing countries,
plus China and a smaller group of repressive regimes which fear being
called to account, are holding up work on the Human Rights Council
because Bolton wants the Council. The G77 is also protesting a cost-
cutting shrinkage in Palestinian programs, and provoking showdowns
with the U.N. Secretariat over administrative reforms, as well as over the
identity of Secretary-General Annan's successor. Annan will establish a
Rule of Law Unit in the Secretariat and order a review of several G.A.
committees which he thinks have outlived their usefulness and mandates
concerning management and the budget of the U.N. secretariat. Annan
believes "misunderstandings" led to the G77 charge that he was engaged
in a "grab for power"; it is the U.N. members' "prerogative to decide
what should be cut and what should be rejected., 217 Annan then accused
the G77 of interference in day-to-day Secretariat operations, and of
violating the U.N. Charter by politicizing the Secretariat. The G77 fears
that reforms will be funded by transfers from human rights and
visited Nov. 3, 2007).
215. Id.
216. See Thalif Deen, U.N. Threatened With Budgetary Showdown, I.P.S., Dec. 21,
2005, http://ipsnews.net/ (click "Search," enter "Thalif Deen," select year "2005");
Maggie Farley, U.N. Hit By a Bolt From the Right, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005; Warren
Hoge, Official Says American Delay of U.N. Budget Would Cause Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2005, at A5; Edith Lederer, U.S. Stands Alone in the U.N. Budget Demand,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 2, 2005; Laurenti, supra note 214; Betsy Pisik, US.
Budget Plan for U.N. Criticized, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2005; Mark Turner, U.N. Risks
Severe Financial Crisis Over Threat to Block Budget, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005;
Editorial, Blocking Reform at the UN., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005; U.N. Members
Approve Two-Year Budget, CBS NEWS, Dec. 24, 2005.
217. Thalif Deen, UN. Chief Denies Making a "Grab for Power", I.P.S., Nov. 22,
2005, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=31130 (last visited Nov. 12, 2007). See also
Thalif Deen, Developing Nations Fault U.N. Reform Plan, I.P.S., Nov. 10, 2005,
http://ipsnews.net/ (click "Search," enter "Thalif Deen," select year "2005"); Thalif Deen,
Move to Shrink Palestinian Programs Spurs Protest, I.P.S., Nov. 30, 2005,
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=31248 (last visited Nov. 12, 2007); Colum Lynch,
Campaigns to Succeed Annan at U.N. Are Underway, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2005, at
A22.
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development programs. World Health Organization employees
threatened a work stoppage to protest reorganization plans, despite
threats that this would lead to their termination.218
In other words, business, or ordinary poker, continues as usual at the
U.N. The lack of public information and advocacy plus the chronic
preference for a narrow and short-term self-interest leaves almost
everyone, including most World Summiteers, unable to see an admittedly
complex "big picture." This picture can usefully be defined as the need
for active pursuit of Annan's interdependent "four pillars" of peace,
security, development, and human rights. Pursuit or non-pursuit of these
pillars will affect almost everyone in the long run, and a failure to
recognize and deal with this fact could reverse the trend toward world
civilization. As Tony Blair argued, we need a better understanding of
how self-interest and mutual interest are inextricably linked.219
Improved cooperation, described here as a commitment to the
liberal internationalism rules of a sustained advanced poker, enables the
players to draw and bet on simultaneously self- and mutually-interested
links among development, trade, security, human rights, environmental
protection, migration (a major concern in the U.S. and E.U.), etc.
Hurricane Katrina showed Americans that cooperation is needed to
reduce feelings of job insecurity and vulnerability to disaster and
violence, as well as to deal with corrupt, fragile and/or incompetent
governments.
Increasing violence also raises the stakes in the game. The poorer
the nation, the more likely a plague of violence will reinforce poverty
and the other evils that operate to deny human dignity. Even President
Bush spoke of a "moral duty" to recognize interrelatedness and the need
to cooperate, admittedly, to pursue his anti-terrorism strategy, during his
September 2005 speech to the World Summit. For most other countries,
the U.N. is a necessary, often the most competent, partner for the pursuit
of vast, interrelated responsibilities. This is why World Summit failures
on non-proliferation, human rights and development, and the partial
successes concerning intervention and administrative reforms are so
tragic. Peacebuilding is the only genuine Summit success, and the
paucity of useful proposals concerning terrorism and the composition of
the S.C. mean that the lack of progress in these areas is a good thing.
218. See U.N. Chief Denies Making a Grab for Power, supra note 217; Andrew Jack,
WHO Staff to Stop Work Over Shake-Up, I.P.S., Nov. 30, 2005.
219. See U.N. Reform Bid Exposes Its Woes, supra note 104; M.S. Haq, President
Bush's Address at the U.N. Has Made the World's Poor More Hopeful, THE NATION, Oct.
2, 2005; Frederick Studemann, Blair to Call for Global Trade Agreement, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2005; Can Its Credibility Be Repaired, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2005, at
30.
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The Summit at least offers a starting point for continued reforms if
members can understand Summit failures and develop the will to achieve
consensus-by-compromise. As Annan remarks rather optimistically,
"reform is a process, not an event. 22 °
IV. Remedies?
The once-in-a-generation opportunity for wholesale U.N. reform
221
at the 2005 World Summit mostly failed. What are the prospects for
piecemeal reforms in the future? The answer is both "excellent" and
"poor." Governance without a government creates many outcomes
"balanced between no longer and not yet,'222 a consensus over
smaller changes to this unwieldy state of affairs is easy to achieve in
theory. However, there is little basis for negotiation, or game-playing,
without a fairly large number of significant proposals on the table to
trade against each other. Otherwise, with relatively little to lose, major
players and coalitions of minor ones easily manipulate (usually veto)
new negotiated legal orders or rules which require a strong consensus to
take effect, especially by changing the game from advanced to ordinary
poker. Reforms are especially unlikely so long as the world's hegemonic
power, the U.S., provokes determined opposition by easily and regularly
setting international laws aside whenever its short-term interests are
perceived as furthered by such a play. This tactic cannot long endure
within a rational international politics; however, along with Europeans,
the U.S. benefits the most from a stable and functioning international
legal order. 3
A useful metaphor for discussing feasible smaller reforms is based
on the Fasces deployed in Republican Rome, as well as in Imperial
220. U.N. Reform Bid Exposes its Woes, supra note 104 (quoting Annan). See
Stefania Bianchi, E.U. Presents its Plan for the Poor, I.P.S., Sept. 21, 2005,
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=29483 (last visited Nov. 12, 2007); Alston, supra
note 6, at 826; What That Accord Really Says, supra note 32; Mitchell, supra note 114;
Frechette 's U.N. Challenge, supra note 78.
221. But see Robert Samuelson, Seduced by 'Reform ", WASH. POST, June 2, 2004, at
A25 ("reform" is "a public relations tool-a convenient label" slapped on "proposals to
claim the high moral ground."); id. (self-labeled reformers "aim to stigmatize adversaries
as nasty, wrongheaded, selfish or misinformed"). These are tactics widely used at the
U.N.
222. OBSERVATIONS ON MODERNITY, supra note 18, at 66 (discussing outcomes from
a multiplicity of his "subsystems" which are arguably like the U.N. "family"). See also
id. at 18, 27.
223. See Clare Short, Depression and Mistrust Prevail at the U.N., THE INDEPENDENT,
Sept. 16, 2005, at 33; Coate, supra note 1. See discussion supra note 16 and
accompanying text. See also Brinkbaumer & Mascolo, supra note 119 ("a morally-
oriented international community did not exist before the Asian tsunami of 2004.
[A]fter... three months of solidarity, everything returned to normal.").
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Rome and Mussolini's Italy. The Fasces is a bundle of sticks, with each
stick representing an aspect of governance. The sticks are bound
together with leather straps and an axe head is inserted at the top to
represent coercive capacities. Each member of the U.N. "family" of
organizations would have a different Fasces, reflecting the different
aspects of governance they possess, but none of these Fasces have
enough of the right kind of sticks to reflect a government. Apart from
the S.C.'s, under circumstances that rarely obtain, the axe heads are
variously small and dull for each U.N. organ, reflecting modest
capacities in the areas of implementation and enforcement. The point is
that particular governance reform sticks, and even better axe heads, can
be added to particular U.N. Fasces without raising the spectre of a global
government, and with little observable effect on nation-state sovereignty.
For most economists, a world government would create unbearably high
agency and enforcement costs. Such costs would likely negate the
welfare gains such a government would create.
The steady centralization of nation-state power that followed the
1648 Treaty of Westphalia is now being reversed, as variously predicted
by Kant's "Perpetual Peace" (1795), Marx's "withering away of the
state" and Bertrand Russell in the 1060's. Sovereign equality has always
been implausible, and the Westphalian system of self-help had to be
tempered by advanced poker rules and institutions to avert disasters as
conflicts grew more deadly over time. National governments
increasingly share power with multinational corporations, other NGOs,
and globalized markets, as well as with international organizations. Even
so, the nation-state remains the only institution with an automatic right of
membership in the world community as a "player." Any theoretical loss
of an increasingly-theoretical sovereignty due to small U.N. reforms is
unlikely to be noticed, much less attributed to small U.N. reforms.224
Even American neoconservatives are not vigilant in this regard.
Smaller reforms can be described as the constitutionalization of
particular practices to further entrench a liberal internationalism, or
advanced poker. There are costs to forming each constitutional
consensus of course, but fundamental game changes may make a
consensus easier to form. Through new treaties, modifying old ones, or
224. See Coate, supra note 1; Peter Drucker, The Global Economy and the Nation-
State, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 1997; Jessica Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 1997. See Posner, supra note 9 (arguing that while the status quo will
likely prevail, moderate legal revisions are possible); Yoo, supra note 9 (despite the
"almost inviolable" U.N. Charter presumption of state sovereignty, states must, except in
the case of self-defense, delegate the use of force to the U.N., in "a law enforcement
paradigm"). But see Posner, supra note 8, at 506-07 (suggesting the collective action
problem of decentralized enforcement is often solved through a self-help).
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confidently proclaiming new customary international laws-an unwritten
constitution-the constitutional goals should be to expand, rather than
foreclose, opportunities through broader and more open channels of
communication. Information would then flow more widely to players
and the public, and rapid global changes could be embodied in legal
changes more accurately. Adding escape clauses judiciously, and new
means of buffering widely, would reduce tensions among the players.
22 5
An excellent article by Joel Trachtman226 explores the most
thoroughly constitutionalized of the U.N. family, the WTO. He finds six
constitutional dimensions, which are necessarily interrelated to one
another and to WTO members' desires and domestic constitutions.
These dimensions include: an economic governance of exchanges of
value and authority; an integration of many, but not all, social values; a
political reflection of the "cultural and democratic integrity of a group";
a legal definition of the scope of legislative, judicial (this author would
substitute dispute resolution), and social interaction processes; a human
rights limitation on nation-state authority; and a redistribution founded
on social solidarity.227 I would argue that the combination of WTO
structures and members' desires operates to emphasize economic growth
at the expense of the functions of human rights, redistributive labor and
environmental constitutions. As reformulated thus, Trachtman's
approach arguably serves as a, perhaps too complex, template for the
further constitutionalization of other U.N. agencies. Better monitoring
techniques and institutions would reduce collective action problems by
reducing the opportunism of hidden agendas and ploys, or cheating for
purposes of the present model. These improvements, plus substantive
means for fleshing out and incentivizing an enlightened, longer-term
self-interest, would enhance the cooperation on which an advanced poker
depends.
Constitutionalization turns mere voting into an abandonment of the
survival of the fittest, into some value system which goes beyond a
simple welfare or warfare maximization by and for elites. Under
pressures on the U.N., applied through NGO "audits" of various agencies
and inevitably partial mobilizations of public opinion, but not by the
2005 World Summit that, perhaps inevitably, left the powerful S.C. in its
oligarchic place, this value system slowly evolves in democratic
225. See JACKSON, supra note 21, at 120-21, 216, 350, 355, 445-46, 459.
226. Joel Trachtman, The WTO Constitution: Toward Tertiary Rules for Intertwined
Elephants, (Tufts University, The Fletcher School, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=815764 (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
227. See id. at 3. Trachtman properly treats the WTO as "semi-autonomous," a
characterization which requires complex analyses of the rest of the U.N.'s law and of
domestic constitutional orders. See id.
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directions. Inclusion, participation and, less directly, transparency,
accountability, and distinctive sources of legitimacy, spawn a growing
resistance toward the exclusionary games of ordinary poker. But
democratization is only in its infancy at the WTO, the IMF, the WB, etc.
Democratic tendencies do not necessarily generate respect for minority
rights, and democratic tendencies can also generate unpredictable,
incoherent and, as in Serbia, illiberal outcomes.
Despite such potential defects, the popularity as well as the
importance of these artifacts of an international democracy suggest that,
with creativity and courage, the G.A. could use them to reclaim its place
as the most important U.N. body. Democratization faces more
opposition than does a "mere" constitutionalization. This opposition
stems from major players, perhaps excluding the U.N., that deem
unaccountability and poker-like secrecy as essential to pursuing their
elaborate schemes. For this reason, the collectively quite powerful minor
players and most NGOs support democratization as a partial equalizer for
the major players' wealth and power.228
As mentioned previously, the complexity, instability, uncertainty,
and incoherence of much of the international law that revolves around
the U.N. family does not stem from an international anarchy. Rather, it
is characteristic of the governance without government that has been
modeled here as outcomes of the leaderless, self-organized ordinary
poker games. The players' interest gets exhausted over who wins and
who loses what and when, with little attention being paid to coordination
of the outcomes. Integration of the unwieldy and unevenly-developed
228. See Alston, supra note 6, at 790-91; Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, The
Alternative UN, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Sept. 2005; Thalif Deen, U.N. 's Authority
Tested By Perils Ahead, supra note 125. See also JACKSON, supra note 21, at 216;
LUHMANN, supra note 21, at 304, 347; WALZER, supra note 54, at 180-81; Alston, supra
note 6, at 811 (discussions of participation which are not tied to a concrete law or policy
are "hollow and tokenistic"); Ignatius, supra note 63 (quoting the leader of Egypt's
Muslim Brotherhood) (the U.S. wants democracy only as an "artistic decoration," since
truly fair elections would threaten Israeli and U.S. interests); Adrian Karatnycky, Zigging
and Zagging Toward Democracy, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2005, at A21 (arguing that
durable domestic democracies maintain the discipline of nonviolent civic action and are
led by broadly-based civil coalitions which force splits within the ruling elite and its
security forces); Marincola, supra note 107 (quoting Antonio Papisca) ("It is impossible
to speak of international democracy and democratization without making reference to the
institutional spheres in which they can actually be pursued."); Trachtman, supra note
226, at 15-6 (discussing the "democracy deficit" at the international level); Democracy's
Ten-Year Rut, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2005, 39-40 ("Latin Americans do not want to go
back to their dictatorships but they are still unimpressed with their democracies."); id.
(only 26% feel they "are equal before the law-the same number as in 1998"); id.
(mistrust of political institutions leads Latin Americans frequently to take to the streets);
Fisher, supra note 43 (explaining the collapse of Bush's democracy initiative in the
Middle East).
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international law rules seems more difficult than a constitutionalization
and even a democratization. Greater cooperation, more of an advanced
poker, is essential, and the World Wide Web offers one model of how
this could be accomplished: relatively few rules which almost everyone
can support because they permit diverse content, and few nodes but
many links which can be "Googled" to solve legal disputes and other
problems. John Jackson offers a legal frame for such a model:
"plurilateral" agreements, which integrate an economic globalization
with environmental concerns, for example.22 9 Agreements could also
integrate economic globalization with human rights, self-determination
with other human rights, etc. With sustained advocacy from NGOs, such
agreements could form the base of a pyramid of international law among
the willing, with increasingly-general integrations emerging at the higher
levels of the pyramid. However, this approach is open to the criticism
that it reverts to the "a la carte" international law that multilateral
agreements are designed to avoid, and it is thus unlikely that such
agreements would even generate a customary international law. A fuller
integration presumably requires a powerful specialist agency, a Global
Law Organization ("GLO"). Akin to a treaty-based WTO, this GLO
could manage "trade and tradeoffs" in law, by integrating the diverse
values created through a decentralized rule-making,230 as well as through
constitutionalization, democratization, and new checks and balances (if
any) as well.
Adapted from Montesquieu, checks and balances are an American
and somewhat French curb on the powers of governance, and an
alternative to a concentration of powers, for example, the monarch in
Parliament under the British model. It can be convincingly argued that
almost all U.N. powers are too weak to require additional checks and
balances that increase the costs of forming a consensus; things are
unlikely to "get out of hand" in the future. This is because a fair number
of informal checks and balances already exist: means of settling disputes
peaceably; practices that screen out much of the abuse that would
otherwise occur, through generalized injunctions of cooperation; and
modest restraints on the use of a naked wealth and power. The most
notable check would be called "federalism," if government(s) existed at
229. See generally JACKSON, supra note 21.
230. See id. at 412. See also Hirsch, supra note 18; Carlos Vasquez, Trade Sanctions
and Human Rights-Past, Present, and Future 6 J. INT'L. ECON. L. 797, 831 (2003)
(suggesting one option by which agreements could permit but not require states to impose
trade sanctions for human rights violations). But see Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign
Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38
VA. J. INT'L. L. 639, 641, 644 (1998).
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the international level.231
As players, wealthy multinational corporations, other major NGOs,
and nation-states channel and condition the creation of international laws
through their game-plays. Probably as a necessary concession to reality,
major players can veto many game initiatives. To the extent that nation-
state and some NGO policies are indeed devised democratically, this
lends an indirect democracy to international processes. A few U.N.
reforms spelling out relative competences could reinforce the
"subsidiarity" principle that aids in the management of complexity:
assign a task to the lowest level of governance that can most efficiently
and humanely perform it, given that governance level's degree of
development. Thus, international action should be, and largely is,
reserved for those things where various levels of the relevant nation-
states cannot or will not act--"externalities" where these states are
concerned. Some of these externalities could be tamed by restraining the
White House, if possible and necessary, and by a GLO which eliminates
multiple legal overlaps. To the extent that the distinction can be drawn,
the politics of these externalities is for the members, and the
administration that monitors, implements and enforces political decisions
of the U.N. family of organizations that has often avoided accountability
for its actions in the past. The most sensitive topics here are empowering
the poor and creating an, inevitably modest, redistribution on their
behalf, especially in developing countries and where the plight of the
poor is generated by the global markets beyond the control of most
nation-states. 32
The monitoring, implementation, and the centralization of
international political decisions requires the displacement of governance
through advanced, as well as ordinary poker games, by an
institutionalization which is an extrapolation from the
constitutionalization discussed earlier. Many U.N. institutions are thin,
unbalanced, and thus incapable of promoting "thicker" human rights and
developmental rights and duties, as well as promoting legality and justice
generally as solutions to collective action problems. 33 Discussing the
231. See Trachtman, supra note 226, at 16. Something like the GLO I propose could
watch for imbalances among values within particular U.N. agencies, and seek to impose
"redistribution" and human rights norms as expressions of social solidarity and as
advancing a new international civilization.
232. See JACKSON, supra note 21, at 454.
233. See id. at 275, 411-12, 423; Evans, supra note 8, at 1056; Trachtman, supra note
226. But see Evans, supra note 8, at 1062 (calling global "market discipline" a "counter-
law" which, I would argue, is nevertheless conditioned heavily by the WTO/IMF/WB
legal complex). But see also Alston, supra note 6, at 791 (decentralization is required to
"enhance poor people's voice"); Glennon, supra note 21 ("To reduce state miscreance it
is necessary to reduce state power; countervailing decent concerns such as
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reasons why customary international humanitarian laws are violated,
Abdul Korama describes a mixture of factors: the rules are unknown,
known but inadequate, enforcement mechanisms are weak, or law is
simply disregarded.234 These are the factors that must be reformed,
requiring stronger institutions to work to reduce the number and
seriousness of violations.
Pursuing a piecemeal reform process as described here, we must
learn to live with legal and political failures, as we describe them, and
expect only small legal evolutions. We have to ask the right questions,
use hard-headed analysis rather than a "happy-think," and quickly take
advantage of transcendent and incremental opportunities. Above all, we
should recognize that much of what we see as necessary or natural is
really a matter of choice or context. For example, dignitary human rights
mean different things in different circumstances, and the seemingly-
unattainable MDGs may merely give false hope, ignore the effects of the
global distribution of wealth and power, be too selective, not go far
enough, fail to attract a sufficient legitimacy to be implemented, etc.
V. Conclusion
This Article is no less complex than the global phenomena it tries to
describe-phenomena of an insider's game like poker. Rather than try to
summarize these phenomena here, we should close with brief thoughts
about the future. After the 2005 World Summit, "many critics wrote the
United Nations off as an institution so deeply flawed that it was beyond
salvation., 235 This Article takes a different, more nuanced view: despite
political (or poker-playing) flaws, a creaking bureaucracy, and
inadequate resources, the U.N. will play a rather uncertain yet critical
role in solving global externalities/collective action problems, especially
if piecemeal reforms are aggressively pursued. Discussing international
economic law while paraphrasing Heraclites, Andreas Lowenfeld argues
that "nothing is permanent except change, 236 and that most international
law of the U.N. is followed most of the time.237 Philip Alston is right to
worry that the "U.N. approach of indivisibility" will become a
"tautology" 238 or perhaps a clichr, yet it currently offers a "big picture"
humanitarianism and state security are simply irrelevant.").
234. See Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, The Alternative U.N., LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE, Sept. 2005; Godoy, supra note 120; Posner, supra note 9.
235. Alston, supra note 6, at 762-65; Glennon, supra note 21, at 613; Paul & Nahory,
supra note 126.
236. Andrew Mack, Peace on Earth? Increasingly, Yes, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2005,
at A2 1.
237. ANDREAS LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 43, 148 (Oxford
University Press 2003). See Global Violence Has Decreased, U.N. Says, supra note 127.
238. Alston, supra note 6, at 784-85.
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with which to confront nation-state players busy totaling up their poker
winnings and losses.
Will the U.N. create a "networked world? A Global Neighborhood
Watch? Managed Globalization?" Are there other facets "to think about
and support an integrated response" from voters and policymakers?
23 9
Through reform, will the U.N. family slowly create freedoms from want
and fear, and otherwise preserve our common humanity? Can new
collaborative arrangements make better use of everybody's expertise,
and of our other resources, in discovering new opportunities and
addressing new threats?240 Some or all of these futures are plausible, but
one thing is clear: to change the U.N., "we must change too."'24I The
most important and difficult change is to stiffen political will at the
nation-state level, to resist the temptation to create law through an
ordinary poker-in pursuit of unstable, short-term, and sometimes-
misperceived gains-by decreasing the incentives to defect from
advanced poker-where incentives must be increased.242
239. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Shadow World, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2005, at BW6
(reviewing MOISES NAM, ILLICIT: How SMUGGLERS, TRAFFICKERS, AND COPYCATS ARE
HIJACKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Anchor 2006)).
240. Romulo, supra note 17. See Alston, supra note 6, at 772 (quoting Christian
Tormuschat: "If human life and dignity are not protected, the idea of a legal order would
collapse"-at least in the liberal tradition). Law-as-ordinary-poker is thus dangerous
because it is not biased toward dignity-enhancing outcomes.
241. Tharoor, supra note 91.
242. One aspect of law-as-poker is the effect it may have on ethnic or religious
identity. Law-as-poker may accelerate the obsolescence of a variety of "traditional"
practices, while paying lip-service to diversity, and may render discourse over law
irrelevant. Such discourse might be based on John Rawls's "overlapping consensus," a
consensus ignored because legal content matters much less than game-bets. See
generally JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Columbia University Press 2003).
Sticking your national neck out by assuming a human rights obligation, for example, is
often seen as, and sometimes is, a game-bet devoted to winning something quite
different. But see Alston, supra note 6, at 809. To give Kofi Annan the last word: "We
must find what President Franklin Roosevelt once called 'the courage to fulfill our roles
in an admittedly imperfect world."' Kathryn Horvat & Pat Shea, The United Nations, 60
Years and Still Counting, SALT LAKE TRiB., Oct. 26, 2005.
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APPENDIX: THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
AND TARGETS
(Alston, supra note 6, at 828-29).
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
" Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of
people whose income is less than one dollar a day.
* Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of
people who suffer from hunger.
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education
* Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys
and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of
primary schooling.
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women
* Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and
secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels
of education no later than 2015.
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality
* Target 5: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015,
the under-five mortality rate.
Goal 5: Improve maternal health
* Target 6: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and
2015, the maternal morality ratio.
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
* Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the
spread of HIV/AIDS.
* Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the
incidence of malaria and other major diseases.
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability
* Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable
development into country policies and programmes and
reverse the loss of environmental resources.
* Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people
without sustainable access to safe drinking water.
" Target 11: By 2020, to have achieved a significant
improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum
dwellers.
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Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development
Some of the indicators listed below will be monitored separately for
the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked countries and
small island developing States.
* Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based,
predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial
system.
* Target 13: Address the Special Needs of the Least
Developed Countries.
" Target 14: Address the Special Needs of landlocked
countries and small island developing states.
* Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of
developing countries through national and international
measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term.
* Target 16: In co-operation with developing countries,
develop and implement strategies for decent and productive
work for youth.
" Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies,
provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing
countries.
* Target 18: In co-operation with the private sector, make
available the benefits of new technologies, especially
information and communications.
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